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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k), which provides for this Court to hear appeals "transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court." The Utah Supreme Court poured over this case on 
November 3, 1999. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Issue: Was partial summary judgment properly granted to Plaintiff Sole 
Source Media, Inc. and Third-party Defendants Donald Junowich, William Morris, and 
Kevin Stitt based on the Employment Contract, which governed Defendant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff Brad Stewart's termination as an employee, and the Shareholders Agreement, which 
allowed Sole Source to repurchase Stewart's shares in the corporation? 
Standard of Review: Utah appellate courts, in reviewing a grant of 
partial summary judgment, view the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below 
and give no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, but review them for correctness. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
2. Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Stewart's 
motion to compel discovery of information relating to Sole Source's financial condition after 
1994? 
Standard of review: A denial of a Motion to Compel is reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard. See Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 414 (Utah 1998). 
3. Issue: Did the trial court err in awarding attorney fees to Sole Source 
in connection with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the parties' discovery 
motions? 
Standard of review: "Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action 
is a question of law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). Nevertheless, "the trial court has 'broad discretion in 
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, and [this Court] will consider that 
determination against an abuse-of-discretion standard." Id 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES. AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules govern the issues in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action for breach of a non-compete agreement between Appellee 
Sole Source Media, Inc. ("Sole Source") and Appellant Brad Stewart ("Stewart"). Stewart 
was an officer, director, shareholder, and employee of Sole Source until November 4,1994, 
when the other shareholders of the corporation, Donald Junowich ("Junowich"), William 
Morris ("Morris"), and Kevin Stitt ("Stitt"), voted to terminate his employment with Sole 
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Source. The vote came after Stewart announced the intention to form his own corporation 
and pursue business formerly held by Sole Source. Pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement 
between Sole Source and Stewart, the corporation then exercised its option to repurchase 
Stewart's shares. Stewart refused to return the shares arguing Sole Source tendered an 
inadequate purchase price. Sole Source later filed a Complaint alleging breach of contract 
on the part of Stewart. 
Stewart answered with a Counterclaim and a Third-Party Complaint against 
Junowich, Morris, and Stitt. During the ensuing litigation, both sides served written requests 
for discovery. Sole Source sought discovery of information relating to its Amended 
Complaint and Stewart's Counterclaim, including documents which might show profits 
Stewart earned through his competing company Prologic, Inc. ("Prologic") and also any 
damages Stewart and/or Prologic may have suffered. Stewart refused to produce the 
discovery, but requested discovery from Sole Source relating to the corporation's and the 
shareholders' financial status. Sole Source refused to produce information for time periods 
after December 31, 1994. The parties both filed motions to compel and Sole Source also 
filed a motion for protective order. 
This appeal arises essentially from three (3) rulings by the trial court. The first 
ruling granted partial summary judgment in favor of Sole Source and was memorialized in 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and Order dated December 14, 
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1998. The trial court concluded Stewart's employment had been properly terminated on 
November 4, 1994, and that Sole Source had properly exercised the option to repurchase 
Stewart's shares under the Shareholders Agreement. The trial court also concluded that the 
"agreed value" was one dollar ($1.00) per share. Stewart's refusal to accept the purchase 
price and return his shares to the corporation was a breach of the Shareholders Agreement. 
The second ruling, contained in orders dated December 14, 1998 and April 26, 
1999, granted Sole Source's Motion to Compel and its Motion for Protective Order, and 
denied Stewart's Motion to Compel. 
Third, the trial court concluded that Sole Source was the prevailing party in the 
claims dismissed by summary judgment, and awarded attorney fees and costs for Sole 
Source's defense of those claims to the extent they were based upon the Employment 
Contract. The trial court also ruled that Stewart's Motion to Compel and defense of Sole 
Source's discovery motions was not substantially justified, and awarded attorney fees to Sole 
Source. 
Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below 
Sole Source filed a Complaint on or about October 24, 1995, and an Amended 
Complaint on or about February 8,1996, alleging that Stewart had breached his non-compete 
agreement with Sole Source. Stewart filed a Counterclaim against Sole Source and a Third-
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Party Complaint against Junowich, Morris, and Stitt which alleged the following causes of 
action: 
1. Declaratory Relief; 
2. Dissolution for Oppression of Minority Shareholder; 
3. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations and Economic 
Expectancies; 
4. Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 
5. Breach of Fiduciary Duty; 
6. Accounting and Judgment; 
7. Punitive Damages; 
8. Breach of Contract; and 
9. Indemnification. 
On or about March 3, 1998, Sole Source, Junowich, Morris, and Stitt filed a 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which sought dismissal of some of the claims in 
Stewart's Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. The trial court ruled in favor of Sole 
Source, concluding that Sole Source properly terminated Stewart's employment under the 
Employment Contract and also properly exercised its repurchase option under the 
Shareholders Agreement. The court dismissed Stewart's first, second, fourth, fifth, and 
eighth causes of action entirely, and his sixth cause of action to the extent it was based upon 
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events occurring after December 31, 1994. Sole Source sought and received an award of 
attorney fees relating to the MPS J. 
Sole Source also requested attorney fees for pursuing a Motion to Compel and 
for defending against Stewart's Motion to Compel. Sole Source's Motion to Compel sought 
discovery of tax, banking, and accounting information from Stewart and Prologic, and also 
information about Stewart's competition with Sole Source during the relevant time period. 
Stewart and Prologic refused to provide the requested information, arguing it was not 
discoverable. 
Stewart's Motion to Compel sought discovery of certain financial information 
from Sole Source. Sole Source refused to produce some of this information because 
Stewart's status as a shareholder ended December 31,1994 and he had no standing to request 
documents or information after that time. 
The trial court heard arguments on all of these motions on July 1, 1998. The 
court issued a ruling and ultimately entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
December 14,1998, granting the MPS J, granting Sole Source's Motion for Protective Order, 
and denying Stewart's Motion to Compel. The parties agreed at the hearing to share 
customer lists and then produce documents for customers common to both parties, which 
resolved a small portion of Sole Source's Motion to Compel. The trial court granted Sole 
Source's motion to that extent by its December 14, 1998 Judgment and Order. The trial 
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court deferred ruling on the rest of Sole Source's Motion to Compel, suggesting that its 
ruling on the other motions might help the parties resolve the remaining discovery issues. 
However, the Court's later Order dated April 26, 1999 granted the remainder of Sole 
Source's Motion to Compel. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sole Source Media, Inc. 
1. Sole Source was a Utah corporation in which Stewart, Junowich, 
Morris, and Stitt were shareholders. Sole Source dissolved automatically by the terms of its 
Articles of Incorporation on June 30, 1996. (See Addendum "H," Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated December 14, 1998.) (R. 586.) 
2. Sole Source was a graphics management company which provided its 
customers with a turnkey program of printing and graphic related services. (Amended 
Complaint, U 1; R. 46.) 
3. Stewart was an officer, director, and shareholder of Sole Source. (See 
Addendum "F," Affidavit of Kevin Stitt, % 3.) (R. 241.) (See Addendum "G," Affidavit of 
William Morris, If 3.) (R. 246.) 
7 
Stewart's Employment 
4. Stewart entered an Employment Contract with Sole Source dated 
December 1, 1993 (the "Employment Contract"). (See Addendum UB," Employment 
Contract.) (R. 282-92.) The term of the Employment Contract extended to June 30, 1996, 
unless terminated previously according to its terms. (Id. at 1f 2.) (R. 282-83.) 
5. The Employment Contract provides that "Employee shall not, during 
the term hereof, be interested directly or indirectly, in any manner, [as a] partner, officer, 
stockholder, advisor, employee or in any other capacity in any other business of the type an 
[sic] character of business engaged in by Employer, or any allied trade . . .." (Id. at % 5.) 
(R. 284.) 
6. The Employment Contract provides that it may be terminated upon the 
employee's breach of the agreement. If the employee 
should engage in gainful employment with another employer 
without the express written consent of Employer, or should 
otherwise breach any of the terms of this agreement, Employer 
may regard this agreement as materially breached by Employee, 
Employer's obligation to make the payments herein shall cease, 
and Employer may obtain relief in the amount of damages 
suffered including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(A/.at1f9.e.) (R. 289.) 
7. The Employment Contract also provides that it may be terminated by 
Employer upon thirty (30) days written notice to Employee. (Id. at % 9.d.) (R. 289.) 
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Stewart's Competition and Termination 
8. In August 1994, Sole Source was notified by the Avery-Dennison 
Company ("Avery") that Avery would hire Sole Source to be manager for a significant 
project known as "Communique." However, after Avery delayed commencement of the 
Communique project, Sole Source determined it could not continue as project manager. 
(Morris Aff., ffi[ 4-5.) (R. 246.) 
9. At a meeting of the Sole Source shareholders on October 27, 1994, the 
shareholders discussed discontinuing the Communique project and also discussed tenninating 
the employment of Alane Anderson and Anthony Dato, employees who were the general 
manager and lead coordinator of the Communique project for Sole Source. "Stewart stated 
that if Sole Source did resign the Avery project, he might be interested in pursing it 
individually." See Addendum "A," Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, ffif 23-25. 
(R. 62.) 
10. After Junowich left the October 27 meeting, Stewart told Morris and 
Stitt that he would not work with Junowich and suggested terminating Junowich. Over the 
following weekend, Stewart told Morris and Stitt that he planned to open a new business with 
Anderson to handle the Communique project. (Morris Aff, ffl[ 8-9; Stitt Aff, ffi[ 6-7.) 
(R. 246, 242.) 
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11. On November 4, 1994, a meeting of Sole Source shareholders was held 
with Junowich participating by telephone. Stewart attended the meeting which was held at 
Sole Source's principal corporate office, and voiced no objection to the meeting being held 
or to the shareholders considering agenda items without prior notice. (Stitt Aff., fflf 8-9.) 
(R. 242.) 
12. The November 4 meeting was called to consider terminating Stewart 
because he was forming a competing business. (Morris Aff., ^ 10; Stitt Aff., ^ 9.) (R. 247, 
242.) The shareholders voted to terminate Stewart's employment as Vice President of Sole 
Source. Junowich, Morris, and Stitt each voted in favor, and Stewart abstained. (R. 294-95.) 
13. Stewart now owns and operates Prologic which was established as a 
competitor of Sole Source. (R. 54, 588.) 
Shareholders Agreement and Repurchase Option 
14. All shareholders including Stewart also signed a Shareholders 
Agreement dated July 1, 1993 (the "Shareholders Agreement"). See Addendum "C," 
Shareholders Agreement. (R. 271-80.) Paragraph 10(a) of the Shareholders Agreement gave 
Sole Source an option to purchase all of Stewart's shares in the event his employment was 
terminated "for any reason other than death . . .." (Id. at 1f 10(a).) (R. 275.) 
15. The Shareholders Agreement specifies the purchase price in the event 
Sole Source exercises the option to repurchase shares, as follows: 
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The Purchase Price shall be the "agreed value" determined in 
accordance with subsection (b), subject to adjustment by the 
independent certified public accountant then serving the 
Corporation to reflect material events and changes in 
circumstances occurring subsequent to the date on which the 
agreed value was last fixed. 
(Mat 1f 12(a).) (R. 277.) 
16. Paragraph 12(b) of the Shareholders Agreement defines "agreed value" 
as follows: 
Until changed as provided hereafter, the "agreed value" per 
Share as of the date of this Agreement is one Dollar ($1). This 
price has been agreed upon by the Corporation and the 
Shareholders as representing the fair value per share. 
(R. 278.) 
17. Paragraph 12(b) then provides that at the end of each year the 
shareholders shall in writing reaffirm the "agreed value" or agree upon a new value. If 
neither occurs, then the Agreement provides as follows: 
In the event that the stockholders and the Corporation fail either 
to reaffirm the value per share or agree upon a new value as of 
the end of any fiscal year, the agreed value most recently fixed 
shall, subject to adjustment pursuant to subsection (a), continue 
in effect for all purposes. 
(R. 278.) 
18. The shareholders of Sole Source did not reaffirm the agreed value or 
agree upon a new value at the end of 1993 or at the end of 1994. (Stitt Aff., 1f 11.) (R. 242.) 
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19. The accountant serving Sole Source during 1993 and 1994 made no 
adjustment in the agreed value per share. (Id at ^ 12.) (R. 242.) 
20. When Sole Source was formed and the Shareholders Agreement was 
prepared, the shareholders agreed that the value of Sole Source stock should be $1.00 per 
share in order to discourage a shareholder from leaving and starting a competing business. 
(Morris Aff., U 11; Stitt Aff, \ 13.) (R. 247, 243.) 
21. By Notice dated December 5, 1994, sent to Stewart via certified mail, 
Sole Source exercised its option under the Shareholders Agreement to purchase Stewart's 
shares. The Notice tendered the sum of $1.00 per share as the purchase price. See 
Addendum "D," Notice of Exercise of Option and Shareholders Action. (R. 297-98.) 
22. Stewart received the Notice and tender of purchase price but has failed 
and refused to surrender the shares. (R. 66-67.) 
Trial Court Proceedings 
23. Stewart's Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint alleged causes of 
action for declaratory relief, dissolution for oppression of minority shareholder, interference 
with contractual relations and economic expectancies, breach of covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, accounting and judgment, breach of contract, and 
indemnification. (R. 53-80.) 
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24. Sole Source filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 
March 3, 1998. The trial court granted the Motion and dismissed Stewart's First, Second, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth causes of actions entirely, and the Sixth cause of action to the 
extent it was based upon events occurring after December 31, 1994. (See Addendum "J," 
Judgment and Order dated December 14, 1998.) (R. 597-98.) 
25. Sole Source filed a Motion to Compel dated March 19, 1998, seeking 
to compel production of documents from Stewart. (R. 315-17.) 
26. Stewart filed his own Motion to Compel Production of Documents on 
February 3, 1998. (R. 143-45.) In response to that Motion, Sole Source, Morris, Stitt, and 
Junowich filed a Memorandum in Opposition dated February 12,1998 (R. 177-211), and also 
a Motion for Protective Order dated February 13, 1998. (R. 212-15.) 
27. All of those Motions were fully briefed and argued to the trial court on 
July 1, 1998 (R. 449), and again on November 17, 1998. At the November 17 hearing, the 
trial court granted Sole Source's Motion for Protective Order and denied Stewart's Motion 
to Compel. The trial court subsequently entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and a Judgment and Order on December 14, 1998, implementing those rulings. (R. 596-99.) 
28. After reserving its ruling for a time on Sole Source's Motion to Compel, 
the trial court issued a ruling on April 12, 1999, granting the Motion, and entered an Order 
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on April 26, 1999. (See Addendum "K," Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, dated 
April 26, 1999.) (R. 620-23.) 
29. Sole Source, Junowich, Morris, and Stitt were awarded $8,394.85 in 
attorney fees and $367.82 in costs, for a total of $8,762.67, for prevailing in the defense of 
Stewart's claims related to the Employment Contract, and for successfully pursuing and 
defending the discovery motions described above. (See Addendum "L," Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, dated July 13, 1999 (R. 711 -16) and Addendum "M," Order Awarding 
Attorney Fees, dated July 13, 1999.) (R. 717-19.) The attorney fees were based upon the 
number of hours worked and the respective rates charged as identified in the Affidavit of 
Matthew C. Barneck, ffi[ 4-8. (See Addendum "N." (R. 649-55.) The costs incurred are 
itemized in If 9 of the Affidavit. (R. 652-53.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Sole Source filed a Motion for Summary Disposition in the Utah Supreme 
Court before the case was poured over to this Court. The basis for that Motion is that the 
Orders appealed from are not final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and therefore this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. By Order dated November 1, 
1999, the Utah Supreme Court deferred ruling on that Motion until further consideration of 
the appeal. 
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Sole Source properly terminated Stewart's employment with the corporation, 
pursuant to the Employment Contract. Stewart himself acknowledged that his employment 
was terminated as of November 4, 1994. No unanimous vote was required to terminate 
Stewart's employment. The plain language of the Shareholders Agreement gave Sole Source 
the right to repurchase Stewart's shares at the "agreed value" should his employment be 
terminated for any reason other than death. 
The vote to terminate Stewart's employment triggered Sole Source's repurchase 
option. Under the Shareholders Agreement, the purchase price would be the "agreed value" 
of one dollar ($1.00) per share unless the shareholders agreed to change the agreed value 
within sixty days after each calendar year. If the shareholders failed to do so, the agreed 
value of the stock would remain at one dollar. The Shareholders Agreement also provides 
that the independent certified public accountant serving the corporation may adjust the agreed 
value based upon subsequent material events and changes in circumstances. The 
unambiguous language of the Shareholders Agreement does not require an adjustment to the 
value of the stock before exercise of the repurchase option. Rather, the agreement provides 
that the agreed value may be adjusted to reflect material events and changes in circumstances. 
The trial court properly awarded attorney fees to Sole Source based on its grant 
of partial summary judgment in favor of Sole Source. The Employment Contract provides 
for an attorney fee award to the successful party for any action filed in relation to that 
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agreement. Although the Shareholders Agreement does not provide for an attorney fee 
award, the trial court's ruling was based on the defense of claims related to the Employment 
Contract. Moreover, the trial court's allocation of attorney fees was adequately supported 
by the evidence and was properly based on the kind of legal work was performed, how much 
of the work was reasonably necessary, whether the billing rate was consistent with local 
billing rates, and if circumstances required the consideration of other factors. 
The trial court also was within its sound discretion to award attorney fees to 
Sole Source both for pursuing its Motion to Compel and defending against Stewart's Motion 
to Compel. Rule 37(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that a trial court shall 
award attorney fees to the prevailing party in a discovery dispute unless the trial court finds 
that the motion or defense Was substantially justified or if justice requires otherwise. Sole 
Source's motion sought discoverable material direcdy relevant to Sole Source's and Stewart's 
claims based on the non-compete agreement, and Stewart's opposition to that motion was not 
substantially justified. Likewise, Stewart's Motion to Compel discovery of financial 
information for time periods after 1994 was not substantially justified because Stewart's 
status as a shareholder terminated as of December 31, 1994. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL BECAUSE 
THE ORDERS APPEALED FROM ARE NOT FINAL UNDER 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
Appellees believe that the orders appealed from in this action are not final 
under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The claims appealed factually 
overlap the claims that remain in the trial court such that they are "based upon the same 
operative facts . . . ." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm., 814 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 
1991). The facts and law supporting this argument are set forth in greater detail in 
Appellees' Motion for Summary Disposition dated October 13, 1999 and the Memoranda 
supporting that Motion. By Order dated November 1, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court 
deferred ruling on the Motion until further consideration of this appeal. By Order dated 
November 3, 1999, this matter was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
This Court should now consider the issues framed in Appellees' Motion for 
Summary Disposition at this stage of the appellate process. Accordingly, Appellees adopt 
by reference the facts and law set forth in their Motion for Summary Disposition and 
supporting Memoranda. For those reasons, the Court should dismiss the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
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POINT II 
SOLE SOURCE PROPERLY TERMINATED STEWART'S EMPLOYMENT, 
THUS TRIGGERING SOLE SOURCE'S REPURCHASE OPTION 
UNDER THE SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT. 
A. Stewart's Termination, 
Under the terms of the Employment Contract, a shareholder's employment 
could be terminated if he "should engage in gainful employment with another employer 
without the express written consent of Employer, or should otherwise breach any of the terms 
of this agreement . . .." (Employment Contract, 1f9.e.) (R. 289.) Paragraph 5 of the 
Employment Contract provides that "Employee shall not, during the term hereof, be 
interested directly or indirectly, in any manner, [as a] partner, officer, stockholder, adviser, 
employee or in any other capacity in any other business of the type an [sic] character of 
business engaged in by Employer, or any allied trade . ..." {Id. at ^ 5.) (R. 284) 
By announcing his intention to form a competing business to pursue the Avery 
contract, Stewart breached paragraph 5 of the Employment Contract. It was undisputed that 
Stewart intended to form a separate company to pursue the Avery contract if Sole Source 
resigned from it, and that he in fact did form Prologic for that reason. The trial court's 
finding to that effect was based upon Stewart's own statements in his Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint, ffif 23-25 (R. 62), and his Affidavit dated March 27, 1998, f 21. 
(R. 388.) Those statements were consistent with the facts set forth in the Morris and Stitt 
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Affidavits (R. 241-42, 246-47), and the Minutes of the Sole Source Shareholders' meeting 
dated November 4, 1994. (See Addendum "E," Meeting Minutes.) (R. 295.) 
A shareholder's employment also could be terminated "on thirty (30) days 
written notice to [the] Employee." (Employment Contract, % 9.d.) (R. 289.) Stewart was 
given written notice of his termination on November 4, 1994. (R. 424.) Along with the 
termination notice, Sole Source proposed a separation agreement which offered to pay 
Stewart's salary for the thirty-day period. (R. 426.) 
Stewart acknowledged his termination and the separation agreement in 
subsequent writings, and specifically that he received the termination notice. On 
November 7, 1994, Stewart signed an agreement with Sole Source waiving the non-compete 
clause of his Employment Contract "with regard to the Avery-Dennison account. . .." (R. 
428-29.) The waiver is implicitly based upon the termination of Stewart's employment at 
Sole Source. Stewart also sent a Memorandum to Sole Source dated December 12, 1994, 
outlining certain financial issues "which require discussion and resolution, pursuant to my 
termination from Sole Source." (See Addendum "F," Memorandum to Sole Source 
Shareholders, p. 1.) (emphasis added). (R. 431-32.) Finally, in an Affidavit of Brad Stewart 
dated April 8, 1998, filed in the trial court in this action, Stewart acknowledges receiving the 
termination notice on or about November 4, 1994. (R. 407-08.) 
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These undisputed facts show that Stewart's employment was terminated as of 
November 4, 1994, and that his termination satisfied both Paragraphs 9.e. and 9.d. of the 
Employment Contract. 
B. Sole Source's Repurchase Option, 
According to the Shareholders Agreement, Sole Source could exercise its 
option to purchase the shares of any shareholder "[i]n the event of the termination of 
employment of a Shareholder with the Corporation for any reason other than death 
(Shareholders Agreement, ^  10(a) (emphasis added).) (R. 275.) The repurchase option is not 
conditioned upon Stewart's removal as an officer or director, but only upon his termination 
of employment. 
Stewart scarcely mentions the Employment Contract in his Brief and instead 
spends the majority of his argument explaining that his removal as an officer and director was 
done without unanimous consent. Nevertheless, the repurchase option was not triggered by 
any action relating to Stewart's position as an officer or as a director of the corporation, but 
by the termination of his employment. No unanimous vote was required to terminate 
Stewart's employment. His termination was proper and Sole Source had the option to 
repurchase Stewart's shares at the "agreed value" under the Shareholders Agreement. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE "AGREED 
VALUE" OF STEWART'S SHARES WAS ONE DOLLAR. 
Stewart does not dispute that Sole Source gave proper notice of its exercise of 
the repurchase option, or that he received the notice and the tendered purchase price. Instead 
he argues the tendered purchase price was incorrect and that the exercise was therefore 
invalid. 
Contrary to Stewart's argument, applicable Utah case law declares that when 
the repurchase agreement contains a clear method for determining the purchase price, 
exercise of the option terminates the employee's status as a shareholder. Davies v. Semloh 
Hotel, Inc., et al.9 86 Utah 318, 44 P.2d 689, 690-91 (1935) (parties intended that title to 
stock should pass to corporation upon employee's discharge); see also Taylor v. Daines, et 
ai, 118 Utah 61, 218 P.2d 1069, 1072-73 (1950) (shareholder's equitable or beneficial 
interest in stock passed to corporation upon exercise of option). Professor Fletcher's treatise 
on corporations states the same rule: 
The seller may be given the option to repurchase the 
stock on specified terms. If those terms of the stock purchase 
agreement are clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court 
to enforce it as written. 
Fletcher Cyclopedia on Corporations, § 5617, p. 388 (emphasis added). Such stock 
repurchase agreements "may be specifically enforced." Id. at § 5617, p. 386. 
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The case of Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 773 P.2d 834 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
does not support a different result in this case. The Court in Webb cites Davies v. Semloh 
and Taylor v. Daines as good law. Id. at 838 n.2. In Webb, the repurchase option did not 
fix a purchase price but instead provided that the parties would engage in an alternating 
appraisal process to arrive at a price. Id. at 835-36. Accordingly, the Court concluded the 
contract did not intend title to the shares to pass upon exercise of the option. Id. at 838-39. 
The terms of the Shareholders Agreement in this case are clear and 
unambiguous, and it was the trial court's duty to enforce the Agreement as written. Fletcher, 
§5716. Paragraph 10(a) of the Shareholders Agreement clearly gives Sole Source the right 
to repurchase Stewart's shares upon his termination "for any reason other than death." 
(R. 275.) Paragraph 12 establishes the purchase price as the "agreed value" of $1.00 per 
share "unless changed hereafter...." (Shareholders Agreement, % 12(a).) (R. 277.) This was 
the price "agreed upon by the Corporation and the Shareholders as representing the fair value 
per share." {Id. atf 12(b).) (R. 278.) The Shareholders Agreement provides that the "agreed 
value" may be changed at the end of a fiscal year if (i) the shareholders agree upon a new 
value or (ii) the value is adjusted by the independent certified public serving the corporation 
"to reflect material events and changes in circumstances" occurring since the agreed value 
was last fixed. {Id. at ffif 12(a), (b).) (R. 277-78.) If the agreed value is not so changed, then 
the last agreed value shall "continue in effect for all purposes." {Id. at \ 12(b).) (R. 278.) 
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It is undisputed that the Sole Source shareholders did not agree upon a new 
value per share and that the value was never adjusted by the company's accountant. Thus, 
the "agreed value" in December 1994 was $ 1.00 per share. The Notice of Exercise of Option 
and Shareholders Action both recited and tendered the proper purchase price of $1.00 per 
share. Stewart does not dispute that the last "agreed value" was $ 1.00 per share. Yet Stewart 
admits that he refused to tender his shares to Sole Source only because he challenges the 
tendered purchase price. On those undisputed facts, the trial court correctly enforced the 
Shareholders Agreement and declared Stewart's status as shareholder terminated as of 
December 31, 1994. 
Stewart nevertheless contends adjustment of the agreed value by the accountant 
was mandatory and not permissive. He argues the words "subject to" required the 
accountant to adjust the agreed value, rather than permitting an adjustment if circumstances 
warranted it. Stewart's argument runs counter to the plain language of the agreement and the 
intent of the parties. To ascertain the intent of the parties to a contract, courts first look to 
the four corners of the agreement. Krauss v. Utah State DepL o/Transp., 852 P.2d 1014 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (overruled on other grounds). In so doing, the court must consider each 
provision in relation to all the others. Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 
766, 770 (Utah 1995). The primary rule in contract interpretation is to determine what the 
parties intended "by looking at the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, 
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giving an objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole." Sears v. 
Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah 1982). When a written contract is unambiguous, 
the intent of the parties can be determined from the words of the agreement and extrinsic 
evidence is not considered. R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Ind, 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 
(Utah 1997) (citing Black's Law Dictionary, 73 (5th ed. 1979)). 
The intentions of the parties are clear from the face of the Shareholders 
Agreement, and Stewart's arguments must fail. First, the Shareholders Agreement uses 
mandatory language in several places in contrast to the words "subject to." For instance, 
Paragraph 10 of the Agreement states that the corporation "shall have the option to purchase 
all of the Shares owned by [a] Shareholder at his or her termination of employment." 
(R. 275.) The Agreement also mandates that the purchase price "shall be determined" 
according to Paragraph 12(a) and (b). (R. 277'-78.) Notice to any shareholder "shall be 
personally delivered or mailed by registered or certified mail," (id. at U 16(a)), and the 
Agreement "shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah." (Id at % 16(c).) (R. 279.) 
The Shareholders Agreement easily could have used the word "shall" to create a mandatory 
adjustment by the accountant, but instead it twice uses the words "subject to."1 This 
*In support of his argument that the words "subject to" somehow invoke a condition 
precedent, Stewart cites GRD Development Co., Inc. v. Foreca, SA., 747 S. W.2d 9 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1988), and Ryiz v. Federal Insurance Co., 497 A.2d 1001 (Conn. Ct. App. 1985) as 
persuasive authority. The cases hold that the words "subject to" may condition an event upon 
the occurrence of a preceding event, but only in general terms. Thus, the GRD court stated 
that "employment of such words as . . . 'subject to' usually indicate that a promise is not to 
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contrasting language supports the trial court's conclusion that adjustment by the accountant 
was permissive and not mandatory. The trial court thus correctly considered the provisions 
at issue "in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring 
none." Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) (citation 
omitted). 
Second, the Shareholders Agreement provides for an adjustment by the 
accountant only "to reflect material events and changes in circumstances" occurring since the 
agreed value was last fixed. (Shareholders Agreement, ^  12(a).) (R. 277.) When Stewart was 
terminated, the corporation was less than 18 months old. Even if the accountant had 
reassessed the agreed value, there is no evidence that any "material events and changes in 
circumstances" had occurred to support a different value. This language shows the parties 
intended that no adjustment would occur if there were no such events or circumstances. No 
shareholder—including Stewart—made a request for an adjustment of the agreed value at any 
time before Sole Source exercised its option to repurchase Stewart's shares,2 which indicates 
be performed, except upon a condition or happening of a stated event." Likewise, the Ryiz 
court went only so far as to hold that "subject to" means "likely to be conditioned, affected, 
or modified in some indicated way." 
2Stewart's contention that his request for an adjustment on December 12, 1994, 
creates a disputed material fact is without merit. His request on that date is not a material 
fact because it came after the repurchase option already had been exercised. 
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that none of them believed any "material events and changes in circumstances" had occurred. 
The agreed value, therefore, remained at one dollar ($1.00) per share. 
Third, Stewart's argument that $330.00 did not adequately compensate him for 
his share of the company (and therefore a mandatory adjustment must have been intended) 
ignores the intent of the Shareholders Agreement as a whole. According to the Agreement, 
the shareholders most likely would not receive a return on their investment through an 
adjustment of the agreed value per share but instead would receive returns through quarterly 
distributions. Paragraph 3 provides that all profits were to be distributed to the shareholders 
and the company's practice was to distribute quarterly. For example, as stated in his opening 
Brief, Stewart received his thirty-one percent (31%) share of the $234,000.00 profit earned 
during the third quarter of 1994. Stewart actually earned many times his initial $10,000 
investment, and his claim that "[i]t is simply unconscionable that [his] ownership interest in 
the corporation he built from nothing could be stolen from him for a mere $330.00" is 
disingenuous at best. (Brief of Appellant, p. 31.) 
The trial court's ruling was not "harsh" or "inequitable," but reflects an 
understanding that the Shareholders Agreement was designed to provide return through 
quarterly distributions and to discourage shareholders from leaving the enterprise by 
imposing a low one dollar ($1.00) agreed value. {See Morris Aff., If 11; Stitt Aff., \ 13.) 
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(R. 247, 243.) There was no error in the trial court's conclusion that the agreed value per 
share remained at one dollar when Sole Source exercised its option to repurchase. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY FEES TO SOLE SOURCE PURSUANT TO THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION. 
A. Summary judgment was granted based on the Employment 
Contract and the Shareholders Agreement 
Sole Source, Junowich, Morris, and Stitt moved for partial summary judgment 
to dismiss several causes of action in Stewart's Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. 
As discussed above, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Sole 
Source. Stewart's termination from Sole Source was governed by the Employment Contract 
between Stewart and Sole Source, and the trial court relied on that agreement in reaching its 
conclusion. The trial court's decision that the termination was proper necessarily preceded 
its decision that the repurchase option was properly exercised. Because the Employment 
Contract expressly provides for an award of attorney fees to a party who is successful in "any 
action . . . filed in relation to" the Employment Contract, the trial court was well within its 
discretion to award attorney fees to Sole Source. 
Stewart correctly argues that attorney fees in Utah are generally only awarded 
pursuant to a contract at issue or pursuant to an applicable statute. See Valcarce v. 
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Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 'Tees provided for by contract, moreover, are 
allowed only in strict accordance with the terms of the contract." Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 
52, 54 (Utah 1998) (citing Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) and 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982)). 
Stewart maintains, however, that the award was improper because the trial court's decision 
was based solely on the Shareholders Agreement, which contains no attorney fee provision. 
The argument is simply in error. 
Sole Source, from the very beginning, asserted that the Employment Contract 
was central to its Motion. In its opening Memorandum in the trial court, Sole Source alleged 
the following: 
4. All shareholders including Stewart signed 
a Shareholders Agreement dated July 1,1993 (the "Shareholders 
Agreement") . . . . Paragraph 10(a) of the Shareholders 
Agreement gave Sole Source an option to purchase all of 
Stewart's shares in the event his employment was terminated 
"for any reason other than death . . . ." [See Shareholders 
Agreement, % 10(a).] 
5. Stewart also entered an Employment 
Contract dated December 1, 1993 (the "Employment Contract") 
. . . . The term of the Employment Contract extended to June 30, 
1996, unless terminated previously according to its terms. [See 
Employment Contract, ^ 2.] 
6. The Employment Contract provides that 
"Employee shall not, during the term hereof, be interested 
directly or indirectly, in any manner, [as a] partner, officer, 
stockholder, adviser, employee or in any other capacity in any 
other business of the type an [sic] character of business 
engaged in by Employer, or any allied trade . . . . " [See 
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Employment Contract, ^ 5.J The Employment Contract also 
provides that it may be terminated upon an employee's breach 
of the agreement. [See Employment Contract, ^ 9.e.] 
(R. 256-57 (emphasis added).) Sole Source argued that, because Stewart had violated the 
terms of the Employment Contract, his employment was terminated, and that termination 
triggered the corporation's option to purchase Stewart's shares. 
The trial court held in its Judgment and Order dated December 14, 1998, that 
Stewart had an employment agreement with Sole Source, that the agreement conditioned 
termination of employment on the employee's breach of that agreement, and that Stewart 
indeed breached the agreement by starting a competitive business. (R. 596-99.) The Order 
further states that "Stewart acknowledged '[his] termination from Sole Source.'" Id Six 
months later, the trial court awarded attorney fees. The trial court found that Stewart's 
"Counterclaim alleged certain causes of action based upon an Employment Contract dated 
December 1,1993, between Defendant Brad K. Stewart... and Plaintiff Sole Source Media, 
Inc. . . . , including claims for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." (R. 712.) 
Thus, the Employment Contract was not only implicated by Sole Source's 
Motion but also was relied upon by the trial court in making its ruling. Moreover, the 
Employment Contract does not limit an award of attorney fees to a successful party to a 
claim based strictly on the agreement itself. The agreement provides for attorney fees "[i]n 
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the event that any action is filed in relation to this Contract" (Employment Contract, ^ 16 
(emphasis added)). (R. 292.) Certainly, Stewart's claims for breach of contract, declaratory 
judgment, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing—all of which 
address Stewart's termination of employment—are an action filed "in relation to" the 
Employment Contract. An award of attorney fees to Sole Source, therefore, was proper and 
not an abuse of discretion. 
B. Allocation of fees 
Stewart next argues the trial court did not properly allocate fees among the 
claims on which Sole Source prevailed. "Whether attorney fees are recoverable" and 
"whether the trial court's findings of fact" sufficiently support an award are questions of law, 
reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998). 
Nevertheless, "the trial court has 'broad discretion in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable fee, and [this Court considers] that determination against an abuse-of-discretion 
standard.'" Id (quoting Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d985, 991 (Utah 1988)). The 
reviewing court must uphold the trial court's award absent '"patent error or clear abuse of 
discretion.'" Id. at 316 (quoting City Consumer Serv., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 240 
(Utah 1991) (other citation and quotations marks omitted)). 
The evidence in this case adequately supports the trial court's award. Counsel 
for Sole Source provided the trial court with a Memorandum and Affidavit supporting the 
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request for attorney fees. The Affidavit set forth in detail the amount of time spent and the 
fees incurred in litigating the discovery issues and the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
(See Affidavit of Matthew Barneck.) (R. 649-55.) 
Moreover, Sole Source recited in its supporting memorandum to the trial court 
the standards announced in Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998), and Valcarce for 
the proper method to evaluate a request for attorney fees. (R. 632.) In fact, Sole Source 
urged the trial court, pursuant to Valcarce, to consider what type of legal work was 
performed, how much of that work was reasonably necessary, whether the billing rate was 
consistent with local billing rates, and if circumstances required the consideration of other 
factors. (Id) Sole Source also recognized that a party seeking attorney fees "must allocate 
its fee request according to the underlying claims, and must categorize the time and fees 
expended for successful claims or claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees." 
Memorandum (citing Foote, 962 P.2d at 55 and Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, et ai, 830 P.2d 
266, 269-79 (Utah 1992)). (R. 632.) Counsel for Sole Source did so in his supporting 
affidavit. 
Sole Source also acknowledged that "Stewart's Counterclaim for breach of the 
Employment Contract was intertwined with his claim for breach of the Shareholders 
Agreement," and explained to the trial court that its "defense was in part based upon 
interpretation of the Shareholders Agreement. Additionally, the Motion for Partial Summary 
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Judgment also sought the dismissal of Stewart's claims for breach of fiduciary duty (Fifth 
Cause of Action) and for an accounting (Sixth Cause of Action)." (R. 634-35.) 
Stewart also alleges Sole Source essentially conceded "that it should receive 
only fifty percent of the fees incurred in bringing its Motion because the claims at issue also 
involved the Shareholder Agreement," which does not provide for an attorney fee award. 
(Brief of Appellant, p. 39.) Stewart's characterization is inaccurate. Without conceding that 
an award of fees should be split, Sole Source requested "an award of at least fifty percent" 
(R. 635) of the total fees incurred, leaving the determination of whether to allocate the award 
and the appropriate percentage to the trial court. (Id) 
C. Sole Source is the successful party of this litigation. 
"Where there was a right to attorney fees, Utah courts have allowed the party 
who successfully prosecuted or defended against a claim to recover the fees attributable to 
those claims on which the party was successful." Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. 
Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added). Accordingly, a court 
should use "'a flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in particular cases who actually 
is the prevailing party.'" Id (quoting Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 
551, 556 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
Stewart argues that because some issues relating to the Employment Contract 
have yet to be resolved, Sole Source cannot be the "successful" or prevailing party for 
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purposes of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Although the claims alleged in Sole 
Source's Amended Complaint have yet to be resolved, those claims were not the basis for 
Sole Source's Motion. Instead, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment sought dismissal 
of claims in Stewart's Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint against Sole Source, 
Junowich, Morris, and Stitt. The trial court agreed with Sole Source and dismissed those 
claims, and specifically concluded Sole Source was the successful party and Stewart was the 
unsuccessful party. (R. 714.). An award of attorney fees pursuant to the Employment 
Agreement was therefore justified, 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO SOLE SOURCE PURSUANT TO 
THE DISCOVERY MOTIONS. 
A trial court must, after granting a motion to compel, award attorney fees to 
the moving party "unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially 
justified" or if imposing the award would be unjust. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). Rule 37 also 
imposes an award of attorney fees to a party who successfully defends against a motion to 
compel not "substantially justified." Id. 
Although the Rule states that attorney fees "shall" be awarded to the prevailing 
party, the trial court has discretion, upon finding that the motion or defense was substantially 
justified, to refuse to make such an award. See Garrandv. Garrand, 581 P.2d 1012, 1014 
33 
(Utah 1978). Nevertheless, the Rule's language does more than give the court discretion in 
awarding attorney fees. It also creates a presumption that an attorney fee award is appropriate 
in order to encourage trial courts to impose the sanction. 
"Whether a discovery motion is 'substantially justified' depends on the 
particular facts of each case." Hutchinson v. Pfeil, No. 98-5043, 1999 WL 1015557 (10th 
Cir. (Okla.) Nov. 9, 1999) (unpublished opinion). The facts of this case support the trial 
court's decision to award attorney fees to Sole Source for its Motion to Compel and for 
defending against Stewart's Motion to Compel. 
A. Sole Source's Motion to Compel 
Although Sole Source and Stewart reached an agreement that Stewart would 
produce a customer list for the purpose of determining common customers, the two parties 
never agreed upon production of Prologic's financial information. In fact, the customer list 
was only a small portion of the documents Sole Source requested. Sole Source also asked for 
the following: 
(1) Prologic's financial documents, including copies of any 
employment agreement reflecting gainful work by Stewart as an 
employee or independent contractor other than with Sole Source 
since January 1, 1994 
(2) Banking and accounting records and financial statements of 
Prologic, Inc. 
(3) Tax returns, W-2 forms, and 1099 forms for Prologic and any 
other entity owned by Stewart since 1990 
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(4) Copies of job files for customers of Prologic or Stewart "from 
the formation of Prologic on January 1, 19994, whichever is 
earlier, through December 31, 1995 
(5) Documents relating to work performed by Stewart or Prologic 
on behalf of the Avery-Dennison Company from November 1, 
1994, through the present 
(R. 320-21.) 
All of these requested documents contained information relevant to Sole 
Source's claims based on the non-compete agreement. The measure of damages in Sole 
Source's breach of contract and interference claims was based in part upon the amount of 
money Stewart and/or Prologic earned in violation of the non-compete agreement. Moreover, 
the information was also relevant to Stewart's claims for damages as asserted in his 
Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint. 
Documents relating to Stewart's employment since his termination from Sole 
Source was also discoverable because Stewart had a contractual duty both during his 
employment at Sole Source and for six months after his termination not to own or conduct 
business in competition with Sole Source. Thus, Sole Source was entitled to know of any 
other sources of gainful work in which Stewart was engaged during those e time periods. 
The trial court was correct to award attorney fees to Sole Source. Both parties 
had resolved a small portion of the discovery dispute, but Stewart still refused to produce a 
large portion of the requested documents, even though it was plain that Sole Source's 
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requests for these documents was "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). An attorney fee award was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
B. Stewart's Motion to Compel 
Stewart argues that his motion to compel production of Sole Source documents 
was substantially justified because his status as a shareholder was unclear at the time he 
made his requests. Stewart's argument misses the mark, however, because his requests for 
documents from Sole Source were made "in an effort to determine, among other things, what 
the value of the company was and where the assets of the company were transferred after his 
termination." (Brief of Appellant, p. 45 (citing R. 146-58) (emphasis added)). 
Essentially, Stewart sought to discover information relating to the "agreed 
value" of his shares, not to his status as a shareholder. In fact, Stewart himself acknowledged 
that his employment had been terminated, resulting in the exercise of the repurchase option 
under the Shareholders Agreement. Absent clear status as a shareholder of Sole Source, 
Stewart had no basis to pursue discovery relating to time periods after December 31, 1994, 
because he "had ceased to be a shareholder at the time the action was commenced." T. Bjur 
& K. Elkins, Fletcher Encyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 1286 (1993).3 
3Sole Source had already provided responsive documents through the end of 1994; 
therefore, Stewart had enough relevant information to make his own independent analysis 
of the share value, if necessary. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's decisions 
relating to Sole Source's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and both parties' motions 
to compel discovery. Partial summary judgment was appropriate because the undisputed 
facts show Stewart breached his Employment Contract with Sole Source. Sole Source then 
properly exercised its option to repurchase Stewart's shares in the corporation at the agreed 
value of one dollar per share. 
Once Stewart was terminated as an employee and the repurchase option was 
properly exercised, his shareholder status ceased. Stewart therefore had no standing to seek 
discovery of documents or information relating to the corporation's financial condition after 
December 31, 1994. Stewart also had no substantial justification for defending against Sole 
Source's Motion to Compel discovery of information that was reasonably calculated to lead 
to admissible evidence. The information Sole Source sought was directly related not only 
to Sole Source's claims but also to those Stewart alleged in his counterclaim. The trial court 
was thus within its discretion to award attorney fees to Sole Source and did so based on a 
detailed allocation of fees and in consideration of established standards. For the same 
reasons, Appellees are entitled to an additional award of attorney fees if their defense of this 
appeal is successful. 
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Sole Source respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's rulings 
in this matter. 
2A DATED this C/\ day of July, 2000. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
lew C. Barneck 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM "A" 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
COUNTERCLAIM. AND 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
Dated April 16,1996 
X 
JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI (Bar No. 2959) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
(Q I 
- ? . M : " - , ;-V:; , :T 
STATE OF UTAH 
- 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah 
corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
PROLOGIC, a Utah partnership, Defendant 
and BRAD STEWART Defendant, Counter-
claimant and Third-Party Plaintiff, 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT, 
COUNTERCLAIM, AND THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 950907433 
Judge Glen Iwasaki 
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM MORRIS, 
and KEVIN STITT, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
—oooOooo— 
Defendant Prologic, a Utah partnership, and Defendant, Counterclaimant and Third-
Party Plaintiff Brad Stewart ("Stewart"), through their undersigned counsel, answer the Amended 
Complaint of Plaintiff as follows: 
answer.cou\cmb 
n n r. r, Q 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state claims against Defendants upon which relief may 
be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Responding to the specific allegations of the Amended Complaint ("Complaint"), 
Defendants asserts as follows: 
1. Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the Complaint. 
2. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 
18, 19, 21 and 22 of the Complaint. 
3. In response to paragraph 2 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that Prologic 
is a Utah partnership doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and admit that Prologic 
employed Defendant Stewart during November 1994, following the purported termination of Stewart 
as an employee of Plaintiff. 
4. In response to paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that Stewart 
executed an Employment Contract with Plaintiff dated December 1, 1993, but deny that a copy of 
the Employment Contract was attached to the Complaint served upon Defendants. 
5. In response to paragraph 4 of the Complaint, Defendants affirmatively assert 
that the Employment Contract speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. Defendants 
admit the allegations contained in paragraph 4 insofar as they are consistent with the provisions of 
the Employment Contract. 
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6. In response to paragraph 5 of the Complaint, Defendants assert that the 
Employment Contract speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. Defendants admit the 
allegations contained in paragraph 5 insofar as they are consistent with the Employment Contract. 
7. In response to paragraph 6 of the Complaint, Defendants assert that the 
Employment Contract speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. Defendants admit the 
allegations contained in paragraph 6 insofar as they are consistent with the Employment Contract. 
8. In response to paragraph 7 of the Complaint, Defendants assert that the 
Employment Contract speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. Defendants admit the 
allegations contained in paragraph 7 insofar as they are consistent with the Employment Contract. 
9. In response to paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Defendants deny that Stewart 
provided any notice prior to the time Stewart's employment with Plaintiff was purportedly 
terminated. Further, on or about November 4, 1994, the only business Stewart contemplated 
assuming in competition with Sole Source was the Avery contract, which Sole Source repudiated 
during the course of meetings on November 4, 1994 and prior to the time Stewart indicated his 
interest in individually pursuing the Avery contract. Defendants otherwise deny the allegations 
contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint. 
10. In response to paragraph 9 of the Complaint, Defendants deny that any formal 
meeting of shareholders of Plaintiff was held on November 4, 1994, but admit that three of the four 
shareholders were present for discussions and the fourth shareholder participated for a time by 
telephone. Defendants deny that the grounds for termination discussed in the meeting on November 
4, 1994 were Sections 6, 7, 8 or 9 of the Employment Contract. Defendants admit that Sole Source 
provided Stewart with a waiver allowing him to establish a company to pursue business from Sole 
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Source's customer, Avery. Defendants deny each and every other allegation contained in paragraph 
9 not expressly admitted herein. 
11. In response to paragraph 10 of the Complaint, Defendants deny that they have 
committed any acts in breach of the Employment Contract and deny that they have solicited or 
accepted business from any Sole Source customers except those as to which express waivers were 
provided, including Avery and Bonneville Communications. Defendants deny each and every other 
allegation of paragraph 10 except as expressly admitted herein. 
12. In response to paragraphs 11, 16 and 20 of the Complaint, Defendants 
reincorporate by reference their responses to the paragraphs Plaintiffs have realleged therein. 
13. Defendants deny each and every other allegation contained in the Complaint 
not expressly admitted herein. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The claims of Plaintiff are barred under the doctrine of waiver. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
The claims of Plaintiff are barred under the doctrine of estoppel. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
The claims of Plaintiff are barred under the doctrine of unclean hands. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
The claims of Plaintiff are barred under the doctrine of release. 
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SEVENTH DEFENSE 
The claims of Plaintiff have not been asserted in good faith and are without merit and 
Defendants are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
defending Plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to the provisions of §78-27-56, U.C.A., 1953. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Defendant is entitled to an offset or set off against any amounts owed to Plaintiff by 
virtue of the claims plead in Defendant's Counterclaim which is here incorporated by this reference. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
As a further and additional affirmative defense, Defendant affirmatively asserts the 
matters asserted in the Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint which is here incorporated by this 
reference. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray judgment against Plaintiff on its Complaint as 
follows: 
1. That Plaintiff take nothing by way of its Complaint and that the same be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
2. For costs of this action. 
3. For reasonable attorney's fees. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
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COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
For his Counterclaim against Sole Source Media, Inc. ("Sole Source") and Third-
Party Complaint against Third-Party Defendants Donald Junowich, William Morris and Kevin Stitt, 
Counterclaimant and Third-Party Plaintiff Brad Stewart, alleges as follows: 
1. Sole Source is a Utah corporation in the business of graphics management. 
Sole Source provides its customers a turn-key program of printing and graphic-related services. 
2. Defendant Donald Junowich ("Junowich") was at all relative times president, 
shareholder and director of Sole Source and a resident of the State of California. Defendant 
Junowich has engaged in substantial contacts with the State of Utah such that jurisdiction is 
appropriate over his person pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Long Arm Statute, §78-27-22 et 
seq. U.C.A. 1953, or otherwise. Specifically, Junowich has transacted business with the State of 
Utah, has caused injury in this state by tortious behavior as more particularly alleged herein and has 
served as the president and director of Sole Source, a Utah corporation doing business in Utah. 
Junowich originally filed this action as a party Plaintiff in the original Complaint filed herein dated 
October 24, 1995 and thereby has invoked the benefits and protections of the State of Utah. 
3. Third-Party Defendant William Morris ("Morris") is a resident of the State 
of Utah and at relevant times was an officer, shareholder and director of Plaintiff Sole Source. 
4. Third-Party Defendant Kevin Stitt ("Stitt") is a resident of the State of Utah 
and at relevant times was an officer, shareholder and director of Plaintiff Sole Source. 
5. Sole Source was an enterprise founded in August 1992 by Brad Stewart, 
originally as a sole proprietorship. Stewart established Sole Source to serve its customers by 
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subcontracting printing services and project management to a network of printing vendors and 
suppliers. 
6. Stewart operated the company himself until January 1993, when Junowich 
joined the company. Stewart and Junowich had met while employed at ProLitho, a printing 
company in Provo, Utah. 
7. In January 1993, Sole Source was changed to a joint venture between Stewart 
and Junowich. Also in January 1993, Morris was hired to provide office management and customer 
service. 
8. In April 1993, Sole Source, a joint venture, hired Stitt to facilitate business 
expansion of the company. 
9. At the time Sole Source became a joint venture between Stewart and 
Junowich, Stewart and Junowich each contributed an amount of $10,000 as capital. Sole Source was 
operated as a joint venture until on or about July 1, 1993, at which time the company was 
incorporated in Utah. 
10. When Sole Source was incorporated, 33% of the outstanding shares were 
issued to Stewart, 33% of the outstanding shares were issued to Junowich, 17% of the outstanding 
shares were issued to Morris and 17% of the outstanding shares were issued to Stitt. Morris and Stitt 
each invested $5,000 in order to purchase their stock in Sole Source. The $10,000 which they used 
to purchase their shares was loaned to them by Stewart. Morris and Stitt have repaid Stewart in full 
for the monies borrowed to purchase stock in Sole Source. 
-7-
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11. When Sole Source was formed, the shareholders agreed to distribute the 
profits of the corporation on a quarterly basis as part of the compensation to the shareholders, who 
were also all employees of the corporation. 
12. Sole Source paid all of its quarterly distributions to shareholders through the 
first quarter of 1994. 
13. Sole Source earned substantial second quarter revenues as the result of two 
large projects produced in May and June 1994. One of the large projects was produced for R.R. 
Donnelley ("Donnelley"). Sole Source was selected by Donnelley as a subcontractor to produce a 
product that was one of several components of an office products line called "Communique1". This 
product is owned by Avery-Dennison ("Avery") and marketed nationwide. 
14. Avery had selected Donnelley to handle the project management of 
Communique1. This selection was mainly due to the sales efforts of Alane Anderson ("Anderson") 
a Donnelley sales person assigned to the Avery account. Anderson serviced the Avery account for 
over three years and had been successful in establishing relationships with the key management and 
purchasing personnel at Avery. 
15. The Communique' project was forecast to generate in excess of $10 million 
dollars in annual sales. As a Donnelley representative, Anderson was intricately involved in the 
conception and development of the Communique' project within the Avery organization. 
16. Sole Source was selected by Donnelley as a subcontractor through a 
connection between Anderson and Junowich. Anderson was assigned to take over select accounts 
upon Junowich*s resignation from Donnelley in January 1993. Anderson contacted Sole Source to 
participate as a subcontractor to Donnelley in the production of one component for Communique'. 
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17. The overall project management by Donnelley for Avery was problematic. 
Donnelley contracted out most of the print manufacturing, and despite efforts by Anderson, the job 
delivered significantly late to Avery. However, Sole Source was, upon information, the only 
subcontractor that delivered on time and within quality standards. 
18. Due to the poor performance on behalf by Donnelley, it was Avery's decision 
to solicit proposals from other vendors regarding the project management of Communique'. At this 
time, Sole Source made an offer of employment to Anderson, contingent upon the award of the 
project from Avery. 
19. Sole Source was awarded the project from Avery in late August 1994 and 
Anderson joined Sole Source as an employee immediately thereafter to represent Sole Source in the 
coordination and servicing of the Avery account. 
20. As a result of the late delivery of the product to Avery before Sole Source was 
awarded the project, the sales and marketing momentum of the Communique' project diminished. 
The forecast given to Sole Source by Avery was extended several times beyond the original 
schedule. 
21. In late October 1994, Junowich met with the Sole Source shareholders and 
announced that Anderson had received information from Avery that the project would be further 
delayed and potentially downsized. Junowich also represented to the shareholders of Sole Source 
that Anderson had given her notice of resignation as an employee of Sole Source, due to the 
wavering commitment from Avery. 
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22. Unknown to the shareholders of Sole Source at the time, Junowich had denied 
a request by Anderson to come to Salt Lake City to participate in discussions regarding the status 
of the Avery account. 
23. At the same meeting of Sole Source shareholders in late October 1994, 
Junowich called for a vote to lay off Anderson and another Sole Source employee, Tony Dato 
("Dato"), the general manager and lead coordinator of the Avery project. 
24. At the same meeting, Junowich proposed that Sole Source resign from the 
Avery Communique' project. 
25. In this meeting, Stewart voiced reservation about laying off Anderson and 
Dato without additional information from Anderson regarding the status of the Avery account. 
Stewart proposed that Dato continue on staff for such time until Sole Source could accurately 
determine the future prospects of a continuing relationship with Avery on the Communique1 project. 
Stewart expressed his concern that, especially if Anderson were to resign her employment at Sole 
Source, it was essential to keep part of the Avery project team intact in order to continue the 
relationship and maintain the account with Avery. At no time did Stewart vote to terminate or lay 
off Anderson. To the contrary, Junowich told the Sole Source directors that Anderson had resigned 
her employment. Stewart objected to the course of action proposed by Junowich, particularly 
resigning the Avery account, at least until further information cold be obtained. Stewart stated that 
if Sole Source did resign the Avery project, he might be interested in pursuing it individually. 
26. At this meeting, the other shareholders, Morris and Stitt, agreed with Stewart 
to retain Dato as an employee of Sole Source until further information could be obtained regarding 
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new developments with Anderson and Avery. However, on the following day, Morris and Stitt 
changed their position and Dato was terminated on Friday, October 28, 1994. 
27. Also on Friday, October 28,1994, Anderson attempted to contact Sole Source 
from California. Upon information and belief, Junowich declined to take any calls from Anderson. 
28. Stewart attempted to call Anderson over the weekend of October 29-30,1994 
and finally communicated with her by telephone on Monday, October 31, 1994. At that time, 
Anderson advised Stewart that Junowich had met with her in California on Sunday, October 30, 
1994 and advised her that the shareholders of Sole Source had voted to terminate her employment 
effective immediately. In further discussions, Anderson denied that she had submitted her 
resignation and denied that she had ever made any reference to Junowich about leaving the 
employment of Sole Source. She indicated surprise that Sole Source was considering resigning from 
the Avery account and surprise about the lay offs of herself and Dato. She said Junowich 
represented to her that Stewart would be attempting to take over the Avery account and that Stewart 
had voted to terminate Anderson. 
29. Also on Monday, October 31,1994, Stewart initiated a telephone conference 
call between Morris, Stitt, Stewart and Anderson in Salt Lake City. Anderson related her recent 
discussions with Avery and indicated that she had never told Junowich that she intended to resign 
her employment at Sole Source. 
30. From October 31 to November 4, 1994, Stewart contacted Avery and 
attempted to obtain additional information about project developments. Representatives of Avery 
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indicated reluctance to deal with Sole Source given the developments, including the termination of 
Anderson and Dato. 
31. Upon information and belief, Avery was disappointed to learn that Sole 
Source had terminated Anderson and was concerned about the position Sole Source had taken 
respecting not continuing with the Communique1 project. 
32. During the period from October 31 through November 4, 1994, Stewart 
consulted with Morris and Stitt and expressed his concern about losing the Avery account and losing 
employees Anderson and Dato. Stewart advised Morris and Stitt that he was interested in retaining 
the Avery account, and if Sole Source could not or would not do so, he was interested in finding 
another method by which the account could be salvaged. 
33. On November 4, 1994, in an informal meeting between Stewart, Stitt and 
Morris, Junowich was joined to the conference by telephone. During the course of the conference, 
Junowich, Morris and Stitt, voted to terminate Stewart's employment. Stewart opposed this action. 
Stewart was advised that if he wanted to pursue the Avery account independently or through a new 
venture, that he would be free to do so and that none of the shareholders of Sole Source, or Sole 
Source itself, would view such action to be in violation of any shareholder agreement, employment 
agreement or other restrictive covenant or that Sole Source would waive any such covenant. 
34. After his employment with Sole Source was purportedly terminated, Stewart 
advised Morris, Stitt and Sole Source that, under these circumstances, he intended to form a new 
venture and pursue the Avery business. 
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35. By a letter to its employees dated November 4, 1994, signed by Junowich, 
Morris and Stitt, Sole Source announced the termination of Stewart, Dato and Anderson (aka 
Abbott.) The letter circulated by Sole Source stated in pertinent part: 
In an effort to support Brad Stewart in pursuing other business 
opportunities, he is immediately relieved of all Sole Source Media 
board of directors and management duties and responsibilities. His 
management salary of $4,000 per month and related expenses are to 
be terminated effective November 4, 1994. As this change is 
effective immediately, this will require Brad to return all keys, credit 
cards, and Sole Source property by 5:00 p.m. Friday, November 4, 
1994. All personal items must be removed at that time. 
The letter further stated: 
Unfortunately, this "unexpected" turn of events has caused us to 
evaluate the corporation "under a new light". These decisions have 
come after much deliberation and we believe they are made with the 
best interests of all parties in mind. We wish Brad, Tony and Alane 
continued success in pursuit of their "new" venture. 
Stewart did not consent to his termination by Sole Source either as an employee or as a"director. 
36. Also on November 4, 1994, Sole Source offered Stewart a separation 
agreement, conveyed to him in a written offer. 
37. On November 7,1994, Sole Source granted a written waiver to Stewart of the 
non-compete clause which prohibited his solicitation of existing customers of Sole Source as it 
applied to the Avery-Dennison account. The waiver specifically provided that it was intended to 
"allow a smooth and cooperative transition of the Avery-Dennison business to the new company, 
yet unnamed" and provided "the waiver of the non-compete clause with regard to Avery-Dennison 
account which would allow for Brad Stewart to actively participate in the function and operation of 
the new company." The document further waived the provision that "prevents any Sole Source 
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Media, Inc. shareholder from assuming ownership or a shareholder position with any other 
company." 
38. Subsequently, Sole Source, through Morris and Stitt, provided an oral waiver 
to Stewart and/or his new company (which later became known as Prologic), respecting Prologic's 
pursuit of the business of another Sole Source account, Bonneville Communications, Inc. 
("Bonneville"). 
39. Consistent with its oral waiver of the Sole Source non-compete clause 
contained in the agreement Stewart had executed, several weeks after Stewart had moved out of his 
office at Sole Source, Sole Source delivered its customer and project files from previous Bonneville 
projects to Stewart and Prologic. 
40. The waivers respecting the Avery-Dennison and Bonneville accounts were 
further memorialized in a proposed settlement agreement proposed by Sole Source, Junowich, 
Morris and Stitt dated March 15, 1995. That proposal specifically provided: 
The company hereby agrees that Stewart may solicit or otherwise 
contact the following customers or prospective customers of the 
company: Bonneville Communications, Josten's Learning Corp., 
A very-Dennis (sic). Except for these customers, and as further 
consideration of the settlement payment, Stewart agrees to abide by 
the non-compete provisions of Section 8 of the Employment 
Contract, more specifically that for the entire period of time starting 
with the date of this agreement and ending October 31, 1995, he will 
not contact any present or prospective customer of the company of 
which he knew or had reason to know the existence of at November 
4, 1994. 
41. By a letter dated December 5, 1994, Stewart was advised that the majority 
shareholders of Sole Source had voted on November 4, 1994 to terminate Stewart, pursuant to 
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Section 9(e) of the Employment Contract and Sole Source had resolved to exercise an option to 
purchase all of Stewart's 330 shares of Sole Source stock one dollar per share or $330.00. 
42. In the course of the business of Sole Source, Sole Source sought a credit 
facility from First Security Bank. Stewart personally guaranteed the credit line which First Security 
Bank ultimately made available to Sole Source. 
43. On information and belief, Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt 
agreed and conspired to cause Sole Source to terminate Stewart's employment. Upon information, 
this action was taken so that Stewart would not be able to investigate fabrications and 
misrepresentations made by Junowich to Sole Source and its officers, directors and shareholders 
respecting the Avery account and the alleged resignation of Anderson. 
44. Upon information and belief, Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and 
Stitt agreed and conspired to cause Sole Source to offer only $330 or $1.00 per share for the 
purchase of Stewart's stock, supposedly pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement between Stewart 
and Sole Source. 
45. The actions of Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt, and Sole 
Source breached the Shareholders Agreement by failing to offer to Stewart the compensation 
bargained for since they only offered Stewart a nominal amount for his stock, which was grossly less 
than the value of the stock, particularly given that Stewart had invested more than $10,000 in cash 
and significant efforts which contributed value to Sole Source. Stewart's Sole Source stock was 
unconscionably undervalued at $1.00 per share given the salary expectations of Stewart, based upon 
the history of compensation paid to him by the corporation, and given that he had guaranteed a line 
of credit in favor of Sole Source from First Security Bank. 
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46. The Shareholders Agreement relied upon by Sole Source and Third-Party 
Defendants provides in f 12(a)(ii) as follows: 
In all other cases, including without limitation a proposed transfer or 
the disposition not constituting a sale described in subsection (a)(i), 
the Purchase Price shall be the "agreed value" determined in 
accordance with subsection (b) subject to adjustment by the 
independent certified public accountant then serving the Corporation 
to reflect material events and changes in circumstances occurring 
subsequent to the date on which the agreed value was last fixed. 
Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 12 of the Shareholders Agreement provides for the adjustment of the 
agreed value by the company's then certified public accountant in the event the stockholders in the 
corporation fail to either reaffirm the value per share or agree upon a new value at the end of any 
fiscal year. 
48. In violation of the Agreement, Sole Source and Junowich, Morris and Stitt 
ignored this provision of the Shareholders Agreement and made no effort to adjust the amount 
offered for Stewart's shares to reflect material events and factors which increased the value of 
Stewart's shares. 
49. Stewart's compensation from Sole Source was governed by his Employment 
Agreement which provided for an annual salary of $60,000.00 (Employment Agreement, 13(a)) and 
additional compensation consisting of quarterly distributions of net profits of Sole Source in 
accordance with the Shareholders Agreement. (Employment Contract, f 3(b)). 
50. Paragraph 3 of the Shareholders Agreement provided for the percentage 
distribution of profits of the corporation to shareholders. Pursuant to that agreement, Stewart was 
entitled to receive a distribution of 31% of the profits of the corporation. (Shareholders Agreement, 
13)-
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51. Pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement, directors of the corporation could 
not be removed and new directors could not be elected without the unanimous vote of the 
shareholders of the corporation. (Shareholders Agreement, f4). There was never a unanimous 
vote of the shareholders of Sole Source to remove Stewart as a director of the corporation. 
52. Pursuant to the provisions of the Shareholders Agreement, Stewart was vice 
president of the corporation. Under the Shareholders Agreement, Stewart could not be removed by 
the board of directors and new officers could not be elected or appointed absent the unanimous vote 
of the board of directors and the shareholders of the corporation. No such unanimous vote of the 
directors of the corporation or its shareholders provided for either the removal of Stewart or his 
replacement as vice president of the corporation. 
53. The actions of the Third-Party Defendants including Junowich, Morris and 
Stitt, to terminate Stewart's employment as an officer of the corporation and to remove him as a 
director of the corporation were expressly prohibited by the terms of the Shareholders Agreement 
between Stewart, Sole Source and Third-Party Defendants. 
54. Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt signed the Shareholder 
Agreement signed by Stewart. Thus they knew that directors of the corporation and officers of the 
corporation could not be removed or replaced without the unanimous vote of all directors and all 
shareholders of the corporation, including Stewart. They were also aware of Stewart's Employment 
Contract with Sole Source. 
55. Following November 4, 1994, Sole Source, Junowich, Morris and Stitt 
undertook actions to prevent Stewart from acting as an officer, director and shareholder of the 
corporation including but not limited to the following: 
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a. They failed to provide Stewart with notice of meetings of 
shareholders, directors or officers of the corporation; 
b. They required Stewart to surrender his keys to the Sole Source offices 
and declined to let him continue in his employment at those premises; 
c. They withheld from Stewart financial information relating to the 
corporation, including information which demonstrated that the 
corporation withheld from Stewart quarterly bonuses which were in 
fact paid to other employees, officers and shareholders of the 
corporation. Upon information, such bonuses were withheld from 
Stewart even for periods when Stewart was, at all times, employed at 
Sole Source; 
d. Further, while indicating that the corporation lacked funds to pay 
Stewart the monies owed to him for his quarterly bonus, Junowich, 
Morris and Stitt caused the corporation to increase their own salaries. 
Since the time that action was taken, the corporation has, upon 
information and belief, paid Junowich, Morris and Stitt at elevated 
compensation levels. 
56. The meeting on November 4, 1994 was an informal meeting and no notice 
of the meeting or of any agenda or the meeting was provided to Stewart in advance thereof. In spite 
of this, Junowich, Morris and Stitt apparently knew the agenda as the memo to Sole Source 
employees and a separation agreement were presented to Stewart on the same day the meting 
occurred. 
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57. No written notice of shareholder approval of the termination of Stewart was 
given to Stewart as a shareholder of Sole Source. Stewart did not consent in writing to a 
shareholders meeting. Nevertheless, the reported action taken by the corporation upon a vote of the 
majority of the shareholders on November 4, 1994 was implemented immediately. 
58. Defendants Sole Source, Junowich, Morris and Stitt have shut Stewart out 
from the operations of Sole Source. Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt have wrongfully seized 
control of the company and have ignored and are ignoring corporate formalities for their own 
wrongful, illegal and fraudulent purposes, including but not limited to the conspiratorial actions to 
deprive Stewart of his equity interest in the company and his employment. Because of the growth 
of the company and the peculiar nature of the agreements between the parties, Counter-Claim 
Defendant and Third-Party Defendants determined to breach their fiduciary duties to Stewart and 
they attempted to use the agreements signed between the parties to deprive Stewart of his 
employment as well as the fruits and benefits of his labor and related investment. 
5 9. Because Defendant Junowich, Morris and Stitt have wrongfully seized control 
of Sole Source and have oppressed Stewart and his rights as a minority shareholder, the corporation 
should be dissolved pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Business Corporation Act, §16-1 Oa-1 et 
seq, U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
60. Alternatively, Stewart should be awarded the damages he has incurred as a 
result of the wrongful usurpation by Junowich, Morris and Stitt. 
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(DECLARATORY RELIEF) 
61. Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length. 
62. A legitimate controversy exists between Stewart and Sole Source, Junowich, 
Morris and Stitt respecting Stewart's status as an employee of Sole Source, as a shareholder of Sole 
Source, and as an officer and director of Sole Source. 
63. Pursuant ot the provisions of §78-33-1 et seg, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, 
Stewart is entitled to a declaratory judgment interpreting his statutory rights as a shareholder of Sole 
Source and his contractual rights as an officer, director, shareholder and employee of Sole Source. 
Stewart is further entitled to a declaratory judgment determining that Sole Source and/or Junowich, 
Morris and Stitt have taken actions unauthorized by the shareholders or directors of Sole Source and 
Stewart is entitled to a declaration that Stewart's employment was wrongfully terminated. Stewart 
is further entitled to a declaration of the Court determining that he is entitled to be compensated for 
the reasonable value of his interest in Sole Source pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement and in 
equity, such that Stewart is entitled to be paid more than $1.00 per share for his 330 shares of Sole 
Source stock. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(DISSOLUTION FOR OPPRESSION OF 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS) 
64. Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length. 
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65. Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt and each of them are directors or are 
otherwise in control of Sole Source. 
66. The actions of Junowich, Morris and Stitt in purporting to terminate Stewart's 
employment, in purporting to require Stewart to sell his shares in the corporation without fair 
consideration and in purporting to remove Stewart as an officer and director of Sole Source are 
illegal, oppressive and fraudulent. 
67. Pursuant to the provisions of §16-10a-1430, Stewart prays that this Court 
judicially dissolve Sole Source and that incident thereto, this Court appoint a receiver for Sole 
Source pursuant to the provisions of §16-10a-1432 or otherwise pursuant to this Court's equitable 
powers. 
68. Stewart is entitled to damages from Sole Source, Junowich, Morris and Stitt 
and each of them by virtue of their oppression of his minority shareholder rights in an amount to be 
proven at trial. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 
AND ECONOMIC EXPECTANCIES) 
69. Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length. 
70. In purporting to have Sole Source terminate Stewart's employment and to 
require Stewart to surrender his shares of stock, Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt 
have interfered with known contractual relationships between Stewart and Sole Source and/or have 
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interfered with economic expectancies of Stewart related to his continued employment and his 
investment potential with Sole Source. 
71. Specifically, Junowich, induced the other shareholders and directors of Sole 
Source to undertake these actions based upon misrepresentations that Anderson had resigned her 
position with Sole Source. 
72. The interference of Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt also 
occurred when they purported to have the corporation terminate Stewart and to require Stewart to 
surrender his shares of stock in Sole Source. 
73. The interference by Junowich, Morris and Stitt alleged above was wrongful 
against Stewart and committed by improper means or for an improper purpose. 
74. Stewart has been damaged by the conduct of Third-Party Defendants in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING) 
75. Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length. 
76. Inherent in all contracts under Utah law is an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
77. The Shareholders Agreement and the Employment Agreement executed by 
Stewart contain such implied covenants. 
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78. Sole Source and/or Third-party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt 
breached their covenants of good faith and fair dealing in purporting to cause Stewart's termination 
from employment with Sole Source and in purporting to require Stewart to sell his stock to Sole 
Source for an unreasonably inadequate sum. 
79. Stewart has been damaged by virtue of the breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing by Sole Source and/or Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY) 
80. Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length. 
81. As directors and controlling shareholders of Sole Source, Third-Party 
Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt owed Stewart, as a minority shareholder, a fiduciary duty. 
82. Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt breached their fiduciary duty owed 
to Stewart by, among other things, not observing appropriate corporate formalities in purporting to 
direct Sole Source to terminate Stewart's employment; by requiring Stewart to sell his shares in Sole 
Source for an inadequate price; by violating Stewart's minority shareholder rights; and by having 
Sole Source terminate Stewart's employment when to do so was not in the interest of the 
corporation. 
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SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(ACCOUNTING AND JUDGMENT) 
83. Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length. 
84. Pursuant to his Employment Agreement and Shareholders Agreement with 
the corporation and/or Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt, Stewart was entitled to 
be paid his draw plus quarterly distributions of corporate profits of Sole Source. 
85. Sole Source and Third-Party Defendants and each of them, have failed and 
refused to account to Stewart for the amount of the profits and have failed and refused to pay to 
Stewart the profits even for the period during which Stewart was actively employed by the 
corporation and actually worked for Sole Source. 
86. Stewart is entitled to an accounting from Sole Source and Third-Party 
Defendants and each of them respecting the revenues and expenses of Sole Source, the calculation 
of its profits, payments made to other shareholders and directors of Sole Source including the 
amounts of salary increases given to Junowich, Morris and Stitt after Stewart was terminated and 
the amount of compensation owed to Stewart. 
87. Stewart is further entitled to a judgment against Sole Source for any amounts 
due and owing to him as the result of such accounting. 
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SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(PUNITIVE DAMAGES) 
88. Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length. 
89. The actions of Sole Source and Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and 
Stitt were intentional, wilful and malicious as regards Stewart and Stewart is entitled to an award of 
punitive damages to deter Sole Source, Junowich, Morris and Stitt from future similar conduct. 
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT) 
90. Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length. 
91. Sole Source, by refusing to pay Stewart the compensation to which he was 
entitled pursuant to the Employment Contract and the Shareholders Agreement, including but not 
limited to compensation which Stewart earned during the time which he was employed by Sole 
Source, has breached its agreements with Stewart and is liable to Stewart for all damages incurred 
by virtue of its failure to pay wages, salaries and bonuses to Stewart as provided in those agreements 
and according to the practices of Sole Source. 
92. Stewart is entitled to an accounting from Sole Source to determine the 
amounts owed to him and to a judgment for any amounts found to be due and owing. 
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93. Sole Source, Junowich, Morris and Stitt also breached the Shareholders 
Agreement by firing Stewart and forcing Stewart to sell or redeem his shares for grossly inadequate 
consideration. 
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(INDEMNIFICATION) 
94. Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length. 
95. Incident to his employment by Sole Source and his status as a shareholder, 
officer and director of that corporation, Stewart guaranteed a credit facility extended by First 
Security Bank of Utah to Sole Source. 
96. Upon information and belief, the line of credit to Sole Source from First 
Security Bank of Utah, guaranteed by Stewart, is still outstanding and a balance is owed. 
97. Stewart is entitled to an order requiring Sole Source to indemnify him against 
any liability on his guarantee of payment of the line of credit facility. 
98. In the alternative, Sole Source should be required to obtain a release of any 
liability of Stewart to First Security Bank of Utah relating to the line of credit facility extended to 
Sole Source. 
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WHEREFORE, Stewart prays judgment against Sole Source, Junowich, Morris and 
Stitt as follows: 
1. For declaratory relief as more particularly alleged herein. 
2. For an accounting from Sole Source and Third-Party Defendants respecting 
compensation owed tro Stewart and respecting the value of Sole Source for the purpose of 
determining a value to be paid for Stewart's shares in the corporation. 
3. For such actual damages as are proven at trial based upon the accounting 
requested herein and other claims. 
4. For punitive damages as proven at trial. 
5. For reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded pursuant to the agreements 
between the parties. 
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper in the premises. 
DATED this [ V day of April 1996. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI 
Attorneys for Brad Stewart and Pro Logic, a Utah 
Partnership 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed in the law firm of 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C., 525 East First South, Suite 500, P.O. Box 11008, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84147-0008, and that in said capacity, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be mailed to the person(s) named below: 
Russell C. Fericks, Esq. 
Gary Johnson, Esq. 
Matthew C. Barneck, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
lb day o on the l   f April 1996. 
<*. X 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
Dated December 1,1993 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
THIS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT (the "Contract") is made and entered 
into this first day of December, 1993, by and between Brad Stewart 
(hereinafter "Employee") and Sole Source Media, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, (hereinafter "Employer")• 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Employer is engaged in the business of print 
management. 
WHEREAS, Employee has been engaged and has had a great deal of 
experience in the above-designated business; and 
WHEREAS, the Employee is willing to be employed by Employer, 
and Employer is willing to employ the Employee on the terms, 
covenants and conditions hereinafter set forth; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises 
hereinafter contained, it is agreed as follows: 
1. EMPLOYMENT, 
Employer hereby employs, engages and hires Employee to render 
such services and duties in connection with Employees business as 
may be assigned to the Employee by Employer from time to time, and 
the Employee hereby accepts and agrees to such hiring, engagement 
and employment. 
2- TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT, 
The term of this agreement shall be for the period commencing 
on or about December 1, 1993, and terminating on or about June 30, 
1996, subject, however, to prior termination as hereinafter 
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provided. Continued employment of the Employee by Employer after 
Deceiaber 1, 1996, shall be for the term and on the conditions 
agreed to by the parties prior to the expiration of this agreement. 
3. COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEE. 
a. Annual Compensation. Subject to increases under 
paragraph c, Employer shall pay the Employee an annual salary of 
$60,000.00. Such annual salary shall be paid as follows: 
$2,500.00 on the first (1st) of each month and $2,500.00 on the 
fifteenth (15th) of each month. 
b. Additional Compensation. As additional compensation, and 
in consideration of Employee's promise set forth in section 7, 
herein, Employer agrees to compensate Employee as follows; 
Quarterly distributions of net profits in accordance to the 
Shareholder's Agreement of Sole Source Media, Inc., executed on or 
about December 1, 1993. 
c. Increases in Compensation. The annual salary of the 
Employee shall be increased, and the Employee shall be entitled to 
such bonuses, as may be determined from time to time in the sole 
discretion of the Employer. 
d. Reduction for Taxes. Employer shall have the right to 
deduct from the compensation payable to the Employee under the 
provisions of this agreement, social security taxes, and all 
federal, state and municipal taxes and charges as may now be in 
effect or which may hereafter be enacted or required as charges on 
the compensation of the Employee. 
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4. BEST EFFORTS OF EMPLOYEE, 
The Employee agrees that he will at all times faithfully, 
industriously and -to the best of his ability, experience and 
talents, perform all of the duties that may be required of and from 
him pursuant to the express and implicit terms hereof, to the 
reasonable satisfaction of the Employer, Such duties shall be 
rendered at and all places as Employer shall in good faith require 
or as the interest, needs, business of opportunity of Employer 
shall require. 
5- OTHER EMPLOYMENT. 
Employee shall devote all of his time, attention, knowledge, 
and skills solely to the business and interest of Employer, and 
Employer shall be entitled to all of the benefits, profits or other 
issues arising from or incident to all work, services and advice of 
Employee, and Employee shall not, during the term hereof, be 
interested directly or indirectly, in any manner, partner, officer, 
stockholder, advisor, employee or in any other capacity in any 
other business of the type an character of business engaged in by 
Employer, or any allied trade; provided, however, that nothing 
herein contained shall be deemed to prevent or limit the right of 
Employee to invest any of his surplus funds in the capital stock or 
other securities of any corporation whose stock or securities are 
publicly owned or are regularly traded on any public exchange, nor 
shall anything herein contained by deemed to prevent Employee from 
investing or limit the Employee's right to invest his surplus funds 
in real estate. 
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6. TRADE SECRETS, 
Except as required by law or in his duties to Employer, 
Employee will not, either during the period of his employment by 
Employer or at any time thereafter, except as authorized or 
directed in writing by Employer, directly or indirectly, use, 
disseminate, disclose, copy, make notes of, lecture upon or publish 
articles concerning, any confidential information of Employer for 
any reason or purpose whatsoever. Upon termination of his 
employment with Employer for any reason, all records, documents, 
notes, data, memoranda, models, equipment or similar matter which 
constitute, contain or relate to any confidential information then 
in the Employee's possession, custody or control, whether prepared 
in whole or in part by him or others, will be left with Employer. 
For purposes of this provision, the term "confidential information" 
means trade secrets or any other information disclosed to Employee 
or known to Employee as a consequence of or through his employment 
by Employer which is not public knowledge, including, but not 
limited to, information relating to research, development, 
inventions, manufacture, purchasing, accounting, engineering, 
marketing, merchandising and selling. The parties hereby stipulate 
and agree that violation or breach of the terms of this paragraph 
shall be a material breach of this agreement. 
7. COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE AFTER TERMINATION. 
In furtherance of protecting Employer's interest in 
confidential information as set forth in section 6, and in 
consideration of the additional compensation to be paid as provided 
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in section 3, paragraph b, the parties hereby stipulate and agree 
that for a period of six (6) months from the date of the 
termination of the Employee's employment with Employer, whether 
voluntary or involuntary and for whatever reason, Employee will 
not, unless first obtaining Employer's waiver of these provisions: 
a- Ownership or Management. Directly or indirectly, in 
any manner, as partner, office, stockholder, advisor or in any 
other capacity, own, manage, operation or control, or 
participate in the ownership, management or control, of any 
business of the type and character of business engaged in by 
Employer at the time of termination of Employee,s employment, 
or any allied trade; or 
b. Employment. Be employed in any business of the type 
and character of business engaged in by Employer at the time 
of termination of Employee's employment, or any allied trade, 
in any capacity in which Employee could utilize confidential 
information, as defined for purposes, of paragraph 6, to the 
detriment of Employer's business. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall apply only to prohibited 
activities of Employee conducted relative to those geographical 
areas in the states to be determined by the Board of Directors 
wherein Employer is marketing, selling, distributing or furnishing 
products or services at the time of termination of Employee's 
employment with Employer, and the additional geographic area in 
those states wherein Employer could reasonably be expected, at the 
time of termination of Employee's employment with Employer, to 
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market, sell, distribute or furnish products or services of 
expansion of its business activities, such additional geographic 
area to be identified to the Employee by Employer in writing within 
90 days following the Employee's termination of employment with 
Employer. The provision of this paragraph shall not be deemed to 
prevent or limit the right of Employee to invest any of his surplus 
funds in the capital stock or other securities of any corporation 
whose stock or securities are publicly owned or are regularly 
traded on any public exchange, nor shall anything herein contained 
be deemed to prevent Employee from investing or limit Employee's 
right to invest his surplus funds in real estate. Any of the 
foregoing to the contrary notwithstanding, the provisions of this 
section 7 shall not apply if the termination of the Employee's 
employment with the Company comes within the meaning of section 10, 
paragraph a, herein* 
8. RESTRICTIONS ON USE OR DISCLOSURE OF CUSTOMER LIST AND 
OTHER INFORMATION. 
For a period of one (1) year following his termination of 
employment for whatever reason, Employee agrees to neither call on 
nor solicit, either for himself or any other person or firm, for 
any purpose relating in any way to Employer's business or 
prospective business, any of whom Employee first learned during his 
employment hereunder, nor shall Employee make known to any person 
or firm, either directly or indirectly, the names and addresses of 
any such customers. In addition, for a period of one (1) year 
following his termination of employment for whatever reason, 
Employee agrees not to make known to any person or firm, either 
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directly or indirectly, any information relating in any manner to 
Employer's trade or business relationship with any of the customers 
of Employer on whom Employee called, with whom Employee became 
acquainted, or of whom Employee learned during his employment 
hereunder• 
9. TERMINATION. 
a. Due to Discontinuance of Business. Anything herein 
contained to the contrary notwithstanding, in the event that 
Employer, or his successors or assigns, shall discontinue 
operation his business as it relates to Donald Junowich, then 
this agreement shall terminate as of the last day of the month 
in which Employer, or his successors or assigns, ceases such 
operations with the same force and effect as if such last day 
of the month were originally set as the termination date 
hereof. 
b. Prolonged Illness of Employee. If the disability or 
incapacity of Employee to properly perform his duties should 
continue during any employment period for a consecutive of six 
(6) months, Employer, at his option, may terminate this 
agreement, whereupon Employer shall be released from all 
further obligations contained in this agreement. 
c. Death of Employee. This agreement shall terminate 
immediately on the death of Employee, and on the happening of 
that event, Employer shall not be liable for payment of salary 
accruing thereafter. 
7 
00CS8 
d. By Employer. This agreement may be terminated by 
Employer on thirty (30) days written notice to Employee. 
e. Breach by Employee. Except as otherwise provided 
elsewhere in this section 10, the parties hereby agree and 
stipulate that if during the term of this agreement, Employee 
should fail or refuse to perform the services as provided in 
sections 1 and 4, or should be unable to so perform, or should 
terminate his employment with Employer, or should engage in 
gainful employment with another employer without the express 
written consent of Employer, or should otherwise breach any of 
the terms of this agreement, Employer may regard this 
agreement as materially breached by Employee, Employer's 
obligation to make the payments herein shall cease, and 
Employer may obtain relief in the amount of damages suffered 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
f. Equitable Relief. In addition to any other remedy 
provided for herein or at law, it is further agree that any 
breach or evasion of any of the terms of this agreement by 
either party will result in immediate and irreparable injury 
to the other party and will authorize recourse to injunction 
and/or specific performance. 
10. REPRESENTATIONS BY EMPLOYEE. 
Employee represents and warrants that he is not a party to, 
nor bound by, any agreement with any person, firm or corporation, 
whether written or oral, which in any way limits his employment 
with Employer or the duties he may perform for Employer, or which 
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limits him in any way from imparting to Employer any knowledge or 
understanding he may have which might be of use in Employer's 
business; provided, however, that nothing in this agreement shall 
require Employee to disclose to Employer any trade secret or other 
confidential information belonging to others of which Employee has 
knowledge unless the owner of such trade secret or confidential 
information shall authorize disclosure thereof, and withholding of 
such trade secret or confidential information shall not be a breach 
of this agreement. 
11. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT. 
No waiver or modification of this agreement or of any 
covenant, condition or limitation herein contained shall be valid 
unless in writing and fully executed by the party to be charged 
therewith, and no evidence of any waiver or modification shall be 
offered or received in evidence of any proceeding, arbitration or 
litigation between the parties hereto arising out of or affecting 
this agreement or the rights or obligations of the parties 
hereunder, unless such waiver or modification is in writing, duly 
executed as aforesaid, and the parties further agree that the 
provisions of this paragraph may not be waived except as herein set 
forth. 
12. SEVERABILITY. 
All agreements and covenants contained herein are severable, 
and in the event any of them, with the exception of those contained 
in paragraphs one and three, shall be held to be invalid by any 
court of competent jurisdiction, this agreement shall be 
9 
00290 
interpreted as if such invalid agreements or covenants were not 
contained herein. 
13. NOTICES. 
Any notice required or permitted to be given under this 
agreement shall be sufficient if in writing and sent by mail to the 
residence of either party. 
14. CHOICE OF LAW. 
It is the intention of the parties hereto that this agreement 
and the performance hereunder and all suits and special proceedings 
hereunder be construed in accordance with and under and pursuant to 
the laws of the State of Utah and that in any action, special 
proceeding or other proceeding that may be brought, arising out of, 
in connection with, or by reason of this agreement, the laws of the 
State of Utah shall be applicable and shall govern to the exclusion 
of the law of any other forum, without regard to the jurisdiction 
in which any action or special proceeding may be instituted. 
15. ARBITRATION. 
Any differences, claims, or matters in dispute arising between 
Employer and Employee out of or connected with this Contract shall 
be submitted by them to arbitration by the American Arbitration 
Association ("AAA") or its successor and the determination of the 
AAA shall be final and absolute. The arbitrator shall be governed 
by the duly promulgated rules and regulations of the AAA or its 
successor, and pertinent provisions of the law of the State of 
Utah, relating to arbitration. The decision of the arbitrator may 
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be entered as a judgment in any court of the State of Utah or 
elsewhere, 
16- ATTORNEYS7 FEES, 
In the event that any action is filed in relation to this 
Contract, the unsuccessful party in the action shall pay to the 
successful party, in addition to all the sums that either party may 
be called on to pay, a reasonable sum for the successful party7s 
attorneys7 fees. 
17. PARAGRAPH HEADINGS. 
The titles to the paragraphs of this Contract are solely for 
the convenience of the Parties and shall not be used to explain, 
modify, simplify, or aid in the interpretation of the provisions of 
this Contract. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Employer and Employee have signed this 
agreement this first day of December, 1993. 
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., 
a Utah corporation (the "Employer") 
By 1 / ^ y , i 
Its P>».^/><. rv».-*y><ai<, 
Stewart (€he "Emplojfee"]" 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT 
Dated July 1,1993 
SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT 
OP 
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC. 
THIS SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is made as of 
the first day of July, 1993, by and among Sole Source Media, Inc., 
a Utah corporation (the "Corporation"), Donald Junowich, Brad 
Stewart, Kevin Stitt and William Morris (collectively the 
"Shareholders"); collectively referred to as the "Parties", or 
individually, a "Party". 
WHEREAS, the Corporation has an authorized capital stock 
consisting of 10,000 shares of common stock, no par value (the 
"Shares"); 
WHEREAS, the Shareholders are the legal and beneficial owners 
of all of the issued and outstanding Shares of stock, consisting of 
1,000 Shares; 
WHEREAS, the Parties believe that it is in the best interests 
of the Corporation and the Shareholders to establish certain 
agreements concerning governance of the Corporation, to make 
provision for the future disposition of the Shares and other 
matters relating to the Shares. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises 
hereinafter contained, the sufficiency of which is hereby 
acknowledged, it is agreed as follows: 
1. Definitiongr For purposes of this Agreement: 
(a) The "Board of Directors" shall mean all Directors of 
the Corporation then constituting the Board of Directors of the 
Corporation. 
(b) The term "Corporation Act" shall mean the Utah 
Revised Business Corporation Act. 
(c) The term "Director" means any person acting now or 
in the future as a director of the Corporation. 
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(d) The term "Future Shareholder" includes any person or 
entity obtaining ownership of any shares, 
(e) The term "Shares" means shares of the common stock 
of the Corporation presently outstanding and all shares of common 
stock of the Corporation which may hereafter be issued by the 
Corporation. 
(f) The term "Shareholders" includes the person or 
entities named in the caption of this Agreement. 
2. Term. The "Term" of this Agreement shall be for three 
years (3) years, unless earlier terminated or extended by the 
unanimous written consent of the Corporation, the Shareholders and 
any Future Shareholder who becomes bound by the terms of this 
Agreement as provided below. Notwithstanding, the provision set 
forth herein shall remain in full force and effect for so long as 
any Shares remain issued and outstanding and owned by more than one 
Shareholder or the direct or subsequent transferee of a 
Shareholder. 
3. Distributions to Shareholders. During the Term of this 
Agreement, the Shareholders agree that distributions of profits of 
the Corporation shall be in the following percentages, regardless 
of whether such percentages are in proportion to the actual 
percentage of ownership of Shares: 
1 Shareholder 
1 Donald Junowich 
H Brad Stewart 
Kevin Stitt 
1 William Morris 
Distribution | 
31 Percent | 
31 Percent | 
15 Percent 
15 Percent 
The remaining eight percent (8%) shall be set aside to be 
appropriated by the Board of Directors for corporate purposes as is 
deemed necessary, but in no event shall such profits be carried on 
the books of the Corporation for a period in excess of 75 days as 
required and governed by applicable I.R.S. regulations. 
4. Directors. During the Term of this Agreement, the 
following individuals shall serve as Directors of the Corporation, 
and shall not be removed and new Directors shall not be elected, 
without the unanimous vote of the Shareholders of the Corporation: 
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J Donald Junowich 
1 Brad Stewart 
1 Kevin Stitt 
1 William Morris 
Directors | 
5. Officers. During the Term of this Agreement, the 
following individuals shall serve in the offices stated next to 
their name, and shall not be removed by the Board of Directors and 
new officers shall not be elected or appointed unless with the 
unanimous vote of the Board of Directors and the Shareholders: 
1 Name 
I Donald Junowich 
1 Brad Stewart 
] Kevin Stitt 
| William Morris 
Title 
President fl 
Vice President || 
Secretary | 
Treasurer 
6. Dissolution of the Corporation, The Corporation shall 
automatically dissolve on June 30, 1996, unless extended by a 
majority vote of holders of the issued stock at a duly called 
meeting of the Corporation. 
7. Scope of Agreement. This Agreement shall only be 
enforceable against and with respect to the Corporation, the 
Shareholders and Future Shareholders who specifically agree to be 
bound by the terms of this Agreement in writing at the time of such 
Future Shareholders' acquisition of Shares. 
8. Compliance with the Securities Act. 
(a) Each Shareholder agrees that he or she will not 
sell, transfer, distribute or otherwise dispose of any of the 
Shares except (i) pursuant to an effective registration statement 
under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Act") as then in effect 
covering such Shares and such proposed disposition or (ii) upon 
first furnishing to the Corporation an opinion of counsel 
satisfactory to the Corporation stating that the proposed sale, 
transfer, distribution or other disposition is not in violation of 
the registration requirements of the Act and providing such 
undertakings and agreements with the Corporation by the proposed 
transferee as the Corporation may reasonably require to insure 
continued compliance with the Act. 
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(b) Each Shareholder acknowledges that his or her Shares 
are restricted securities that are unregistered, and that he or she 
must hold them indefinitely unless they are subsequently registered 
under the Act or an exemption from such registration is available; 
and that the Corporation is under no obligation to register the 
Shares or to comply with any such exemption. 
9. Restriction on Lifetime Transfer of Shares. 
(a) Before any of the Shares may be sold or transferred, 
including transfer by operation of law and by pledgees or holders 
of other security interests desiring to exercise a power of sale, 
the holder of such Shares proposing such sale or transfer (the 
"Transferor") shall first give written notice thereof to the 
Corporation and each other Shareholder, stating the proposed 
transferee, the number of Shares proposed to be transferred, the 
purchase price, if any, and the terms of the proposed transaction. 
The Corporation shall thereupon have the option, but not the 
obligation, to acquire some or all of the Shares proposed to be 
transferred for the purchase price provided in Section 18 (the 
"Purchase Price"). Within thirty (30) days after the giving of 
such notice by the Transferor, the Corporation shall give written 
notice to the Transferor and to the other Shareholders stating 
whether or not it elects to exercise the option to purchase, the 
number of Shares, if any, it elects to purchase and a date and time 
(the "Closing Date") for consummation of the purchase which Closing 
Date shall not be less than sixty (60) or more than ninety (90) 
days after the giving of such notice. Failure by the Corporation 
to give such notice within such time period shall be deemed an 
election by the Corporation not to exercise such option. The 
Transferor shall not be entitled to vote, either as a stockholder 
or director, in connection with the decision of the Corporation 
whether to exercise its option to purchase his or her Shares; 
provided, that if his or her vote is required for valid corporate 
action, the Transferor shall vote in accordance with the decision 
of the majority of the other directors or Shareholders. 
(b) If the Corporation fails to exercise such option 
with respect to all of the Shares proposed to be transferred, each 
Shareholder (other than the Transferor) shall thereupon have the 
option, but not the obligation, to purchase for the Purchase Price 
that portion of all of the Shares proposed to be transferred as to 
which the Corporation has not exercised its option in proportion to 
the Shareholders then ownership of Shares. Within forty-five (45) 
days after the giving of the notice provided in subsection (a) 
hereof by the Transferor, each other Shareholder shall give written 
notice to the Transferor, the other Shareholders and the 
Corporation stating whether or not he or she elects to exercise his 
or her option, the umber of Shares, if any, which he or she elects 
to purchase, and a date and time (the "Closing Date") for 
consummation of the purchase not less than thirty (30) or more than 
sixty (60) days after the giving of such notice. Such Closing Date 
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shall be the same date as the Closing Date selected by the 
Corporation if it has exercised its option provided in subsection 
(a) . If any Shareholder elects not to exercise his or her option 
with respect to some or all of the Shares which he or she is 
entitled to purchase, each of the other Shareholders may elect to 
purchase such Shares in the manner provided in this subsection. 
Failure by any Shareholder to give such notice with such time 
period shall be deemed an election by the Shareholder not to 
exercise his or her option. 
(c) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the 
Transferor shall in no event be required to sell hereunder less 
than all of the Shares proposed to be transferred in accordance 
with his or her notice under subsection (a). 
(d) If all of the Shares offered hereunder are not 
purchased within the respective time periods stated above, the 
Transferor may transfer such Shares at any time during the 30-day 
period after the termination of the applicable time period, but 
only upon the terms and to the transferee stated in his or her 
notice under subsection (a) . After such Shares are so transferred, 
or if the transfer is not consummated within such period, the 
Shares shall again become subject to the terms of this Agreement. 
10. Corporation's Option to Purchase Shares. 
(a) In the event of the termination of employment of a 
Shareholder with the Corporation for any reason other than death 
(provided, that in connection with the termination, there is no 
bona fide offer to purchase under Section 9), the Corporation shall 
have the option to purchase all of the Shares owned by such 
Shareholder at his or her termination of employment, at the 
Purchase Price. If the option is exercised by the Corporation, the 
purchase by the Corporation shall be consummated within ninety (90) 
days after the Shareholder's termination of employment. 
(b) The Corporation shall pay fifteen percent (15%) of 
the Purchase Price at the time of closing the sale and the balance 
in ten (10) equal annual installments of principal commencing on 
the first anniversary of the closing with interest on the unpaid 
principal balance at ten percent (10%) per annum. Prepayment in 
whole or in part without penalty may be made at any time. In the 
event that the Corporation is in default in the payment of any 
installment of principal or interest, the principal balance and all 
accrued interest shall become immediately due and payable at the 
option of the payee. In the event that legally available funds are 
insufficient to pay any installment, the Corporation shall take 
such reasonable action, including without limitation a 
recapitalization or revaluation of assets, as may be legally 
permissible to create sufficient available funds for such payment. 
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(c) The certificates for the Shares purchased by the 
Corporation shall be held by the Shareholder as security for the 
payment of the Purchase Price, and such certificates shall be 
delivered to the Corporation, duly endorsed, concurrently with the 
payment of the last installment of Purchase Price. Shares 
purchased by the Corporation shall not be considered outstanding or 
entitled to vote so long as the Corporation is not in default 
hereunder• 
(d) Until the entire Purchase Price for all Shares 
purchased by the Corporation has been paid in full, the Corporation 
shall not: (1) pay any dividend or make any distribution with 
respect to Shares outside the ordinary course of business; (2) 
purchase, redeem or otherwise reacquire any Shares other than 
pursuant to this Agreement; or (3) take any other action outside 
the ordinary course of business which may reasonably be expected to 
increase the risk of nonpayment of the unpaid balance of the 
Purchase Price. 
11. Corporation's Obligation to Purchase Shares. 
(a) In the event of the death of a Shareholder, the 
Corporation shall purchase and the estate of the deceased 
Shareholder shall sell all Shares owned by such Shareholder at his 
or her death, at the Purchase Price. The purchase by the 
Corporation shall be consummated within thirty (30) days after the 
appointment of the Shareholder's legal representative. The 
Corporation's obligation to purchase Shares hereunder shall remain 
in effect notwithstanding any transfer of the Shares by a 
Shareholder or any subsequent stockholder. To fund the obligation 
of the Corporation to purchase Shares owned by a deceased 
Shareholder, the Corporation intends to purchase and maintain in 
effect one or more insurance policies on the life of each 
Shareholder which name the Corporation as beneficiary. 
(b) With respect to Shares purchased by the Corporation 
under this Section, the Corporation shall pay any proceeds of life 
insurance policies on the life of the deceased Shareholder received 
by the Corporation to the estate (or trust established by the 
Shareholder and designated by the Shareholder in a written notice 
delivered to the Corporation during his or her lifetime identifying 
the trust as the entity to receive such payments) of the deceased 
Shareholder to the extent of the Purchase Price. The excess 
insurance proceeds, if any, shall be the property of the 
Corporation. After payment of the insurance proceeds, the 
Corporation may elect to pay the unpaid balance, if any, of the 
Purchase Price in installments in accordance with the following 
term: 
(i) The Corporation shall pay fifteen percent 
(15%) of the unpaid balance of Purchase Price at the time of 
closing the sale and the balance in five (5) equal annual 
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installments of principal commencing on the first anniversary of 
the closing with interest on the unpaid principal balance at ten 
percent (10%) per annum. Prepayment in whole or in part without 
penalty may be made at any time. In the event that the Corporation 
is in default int he payment of any installment of principal or 
interest, the principal balance and all accrued interests shall 
become immediately due and payable at the option of the payee. In 
the event that legally available funds are insufficient to pay any 
installment, the corporation shall take such reasonable action, 
including without limitation a recapitalization or revaluation of 
assets, as may be legally permissible to create sufficient 
available funds for such payment. 
(ii) The certificates for the Shares purchased by 
the Corporation shall be held by the estate of the deceased 
Shareholder as security for the payment of the Purchase Price, and 
such certificates shall be delivered to the Corporation, duly 
endorsed, concurrently with the payment of the last installment of 
Purchase Price. Shares purchased by the Corporation shall not be 
considered outstanding or entitled to vote so long as the 
Corporation is not in default hereunder. 
(iii) Until the entire Purchase Price for all Shares 
purchased by the Corporation has been paid in full, the Corporation 
shall not: (1) pay any dividend or make any distribution with 
respect to Shares outside the ordinary course of business; (2) 
purchase, redeem or otherwise reacquire any Shares other than 
pursuant to this Agreement; or (3) take any other action outside 
the ordinary course of business which may reasonably be expected to 
increase the risk of nonpayment of the unpaid balance of the 
Purchase Price. 
12. The Purchase Price. 
(a) The Purchase Price shall be determined as follows: 
(i) In the case of a proposed sale or transfer 
under Section 15 to a third party in a bona fide transaction for 
fair value, payable in cash or the equivalent currently or in 
future installments, the Purchase Price for such Shares shall be 
the value offered by such third party payable upon the same terms. 
(ii) In all other cases, including without 
limitation a proposed transfer or the disposition not constituting 
a sale described in subsection (a)(i), the Purchase Price shall be 
the "agreed value" determined in accordance with subsection (b) 
subject to adjustment by the independent certified public 
accountant then serving the Corporation to reflect material events 
and changes in circumstances occurring subsequent to the date on 
which the agreed value was last fixed. 
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(b) Until changed as provided hereafter, the "agreed 
value" per Share as of the date of this Agreement is one Dollar 
($1). This price has been agreed upon by the Corporation and the 
Shareholders as representing the fair value per Share. Within 
sixty (60) days fallowing the close of each calendar year of the 
Corporation, beginning with the calendar year ending December 31, 
1993, or more frequently as they may determine, the stockholders 
and the corporation shall in a writing signed by all of them 
reaffirm the agreed value or agree upon a new value. In the event 
that the stockholders and the Corporation fail either to reaffirm 
the value per Share or agree upon a new value as of the end of any 
fiscal year, the agreed value most recently fixed shall, subject to 
adjustment pursuant to subsection (a), continue in effect for all 
purposes. 
13. Subchapter S Provisions. The Corporation and each 
Shareholder covenant and agree not to do any act or fail to do any 
act, the commission or omission of which would voluntarily or 
involuntarily cause the termination of the election of the 
Corporation and the Shareholders under and pursuant to Subchapter 
S (Sections 1361 through 1379 inclusive) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, as amended. In the event of the violation of any 
provision of this Section by the Corporation or any Shareholder, 
the Shareholder who authorizes or causes such violation (whether in 
his or her capacity as a stockholder, director, officer, employee 
or agent for the Corporation or otherwise) shall be liable to the 
Corporation and to the other stockholders for any damages, 
liabilities or costs resulting directly or indirectly therefrom, 
including, without limitation, any additional Federal income tax 
liability of the other stockholders for any taxable year of such 
other stockholders during which the Corporation's fiscal year ends 
and the Corporation could have otherwise had an effective election 
under Subchapter S; provided, however that no stockholder shall be 
so liable if such stockholder acted in good faith and belief and 
upon the advice of tax counsel that termination of the election 
would not be caused thereby; and provided, further, that any 
additional Federal income tax liability of other stockholders 
resulting directly or indirectly from a violation of any provision 
of this Section shall be computed by the independent certified 
public accountant then servicing the Corporation and shall be 
conclusive and binding upon all Parties for all purposes and in all 
respects. 
14. Legend? Transfers of Record. Upon execution of this 
Agreement the certificates representing Shares of the Corporation 
shall be surrendered to the Corporation and endorsed as follows: 
"The Shares of Common Stock of Sole Source 
Media, Inc., a Utah corporation represented by 
this certificate are subject to the 
restrictions and options stated in, and are 
transferable only upon compliance with, the 
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provisions of an Agreement dated July 1, 1993, 
by and among the various Shareholders and Sole 
Source Media, Inc., a Utah corporation, a copy 
of which is on file in the office of the 
Secretary of Utah and will be supplied to any 
Shareholder upon five (5) days prior written 
notice, postage prepaid," 
After endorsement, the certificates shall be returned to the 
Shareholders who shall, subject to the terms of this Agreement, be 
entitled to exercise all rights of ownership of such Shares. All 
certificates representing Shares of the Corporation from the date 
hereof until the termination of the restrictions imposed by this 
Agreement with respect to such Shares shall bear the same 
endorsement. No Shares shall be transferred on the books of the 
Corporation except upon compliance with the restrictions on 
transfer contained in this Agreement. 
15. Specific Performance. The Parties hereby declare that it 
is impossible to measure in money the damages which will accrue to 
a Party by reason of failure to perform any of the obligations of 
or under this Agreement. Therefore, if any Party or the executor, 
administrator or other legal representative of a deceased 
Shareholder's estate shall institute any action or proceeding to 
enforce the provisions hereof, any person (including the 
Corporation) against whom such action or proceeding is brought 
hereby waives the claim or defense therein that such Party or such 
legal representatives has or have an adequate remedy at law, and 
such person shall not urge in any such action or proceeding the 
claim or defense that such remedy at law exists. 
16. Miscellaneous. 
(a) Any notice hereunder shall be personally delivered 
or mailed by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, and 
addressed to any Shareholder at his address as appearing in the 
records of the Corporation and to the Corporation at its principal 
office, or at such other address as may be specified by a Party to 
the other Parties by notice given in the manner herein provided. 
(b) No waiver by a Party hereto of a breach of any 
provision of this Agreement shall be deemed to be a waiver of any 
preceding or subsequent breach of the same or any other provision 
hereof. 
(c) This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the 
State of Utah; it sets forth the entire Agreement among the Parties 
concerning the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior 
agreements and understandings relating to the subject matter 
hereof; and any amendment or modification hereof will be effective 
only if in writing and signed by the Parties affected thereby. 
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(d) This Agreement shall bind and benefit the Parties 
and their respective successors and legal representatives. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement 
on the date first above written. 
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC. 
By Donald Junowich * AT--*- ^ ' ' r 
Its President / 
Secretary 
Kevin Stitt 
William Morris 
AJ£. 
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ADDENDUM "D 
NOTICE OF EXERCISE OF OPTION 
AND SHAREHOLDERS ACTION 
Dated December 5,1994 
WTTKTi tif W¥AClSF'QF QWfON 
Afff* W " " 1 0 1 1 1 " * ACTION 
Decembers, 1994 Certified Mail 
Brad Stewart 
(Address in Company's records] 
Provo,UT 
Wtieren* dwrefcoldcxs of Sole Source Media, Inc. (the "Corporation") met on November 
4,1994, at which meeting you and ail other shareholders were present, and shareholders owning 
a majority of die total outstanding shares voted to terminate your employment as of November 4, 
JW4, pursuant to Section 9* of that certain Employment Contract by and between you and the 
Corporation, dated December !• 1993, and 
Whereas a majority of the shareholders have consented to the adoption of a resolution for 
the Corporation to exercise its option to purchase ail Three Hundred Thirty (330) of your 
outstanding shares of the Corporation (a copy of the resolution is attached as Exhibit A to this 
notice), pursuant to Paragraph 10(a) of thai certain Shareholders Agreement (the "Agreement") 
dated July 1,1993, by andaaong the Corporation, Donald Junowich, Brad Stewart, Kevin Stitt 
and William Morris, # the agreed Purchase Price of ONE DOLLA.% ($1.00) per share, oi * Wttd 
of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS ($330.00) as provided in Paragraph 12 of the 
Agreement, 
Tnere&re, the Corporation hereby gives you notice of the resolution and action by drc 
shareholders, and also hereby gives you notice of its exercise of the option to purchase your 
shares pursuant to theteras of the Agreement You are therefore instructed to deliver the shares 
to the Corporation, duly endorsed, no later than December 31,1994, at which time the 
Corporation will tender payment in full, pursuant to Paragraph 10(c) of the Agreement. 
SOLE SOURCE MEPIA, INC. 
ItS: 
ftocto* 
TOTAL P.0*1 
CONSENT OF SHAREHOLDERS 
OF 
SOLF, SOURCE MEDIA, INC. 
The undersized being a majority of all the shareholders of Sole Source Media, Inc. (the 
,,Corporat\on,t) Uo hereby consent to the adoption of the following resolution in accordance with 
Section l6-I0a-704 of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act and Article 2, Section I \ of 
the Coiporation's Bylaws: 
«T«rcing of Option to Parchine Share* 
WHEREAS the employment of Brad Stewart was terminated, effective November 4, 
1994, and 
WHEREAS the terrnmation of the employment ?f Brad Stewart creates an option for the 
Corporation to purchase all of the shares of the Corporation owned by Brad Stewart, pursuant to 
that certain Shareholders Agreement, made as of July 1,1994, by and among the Corporation. 
Donald Junowioh, 2?ad Stewart* Kpvin Stitt and William Morrio (tin "Agrwm*ntM), 
BE XT THEREFORE RESOLVED, that the Corporation tfceK immediately exercise its 
option, pursuant to th* Agreement, to purchase all of the Three Hundred Thirty (330) outstanding 
shares of the Corporation owned by Brad Stewart, with demand for tender of the share 
certificates to be made immediately and full payment of the Purchase Price of Three H-— 1:-
Thirty Dollars (£330.00), as set by the Agreement, to be made upon tender of the share 
certiacates or* or bvfoie December 51,1994. 
SHARK PERCENT 
2A22 mAKRHfa^m OWNED OWNER 
Uon Junowiclt 330 share* 33% 
[Aih 
170*lwr«s 17% 
Wi&am E. Morris 170 shares 17% 
HFC-01"-1**1 3? 
P.W 
ADDENDUM "E" 
MEETING MINUTES 
Dated November 4,1994 
MEETING OF SBUREHOLDF.RS 
OF 
SOLF SOURCE MEDIA, INC 
The shareholders of ill of the outstanding shares of Sole Source Media, Inc. (the 
"CoiporatiorO having met without objection, by telephone, on November 4,1994, having 
therefore waived requirement of notice, the majority of all shareholders voted in favor of the 
adoption of the following resolution in accordance with Article ?., Sections 3 and 4 of the 
Corporation'* Bylaw*: 
TenBJnatian of Brid Stewart 
WHEREAS, Hrad Stewart has given the Corporation notice of his decision to 
participate as a principal in another company in direct competition with the Corporation, which 
participation is in violation of Sections 4, and 5 of the December 1,1993 Employment Contract 
by and between Brad Stewart *nd the Corporation, therefore be it 
RESOLVED, that the employment of Brad Stewart as Vice President of the 
Corporation be terminated, effective November 441994 and that his salary and related benefits be 
terminated as of tha! date. 
VOTE SaAREiiCU?£B 
For Doa Juaowich 
For Kevin Sutt 
For William £- Mocri* 
Abstain Brad Stewart 
SHARES PERCENT 
QSiUm 08BEESI 
330 shares 33% 
t7Dsbar*$ 17% 
170 shares 17% 
330 shores 33% 
Kevin Stitt, Secretory 
DEC-OS-1994 :?:?8 
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ADDENDUM "F" 
MEMO TO SOLE SOURCE SHAREHOLDERS 
Dated December 12,1994 
12/12/94 
To: Sole Source Shareholders 
From: Brad Stewart 
Following is an outline of issues which require discussion and resolution, pursuant to my 
termination from Sole Source. Where applicable I have provided specific information 
regarding the issue at hand. Other items are fisted pending the process of legal evaluation 
and final negotiation. 
1, Car Lease Issue - The separation agreement dated and signed 11/4/94, allows 
provision for the continued use of the leased auto. The agreement also specifies 
that the full value of the remaining payments are to be paid by me in advance, 
with a reimbursement allowance at the termination of the lease, contingent upon 
mileage and the condition of the vehicle. It also stipulates that I provide and pay 
for the insurance. Based on information I have received regarding the lease and the 
insurance coverage I propose the following amended agreement. 
Lease Payments: Brad Stewart is responsible for the lease value in excess of $300 
monthly. Payments will be made quarterly and in advance. ( 3 payments) All maintenance 
and repairs are the exclusive responsibility of Brad Stewart. Information received from 
Chuck Barber at the Mitsubishi Dealership indicates the car is in the name of the 
corporation with Don Junowich signing only as a "corporate guarantor" and therefore is 
not exposed personally on the lease as was originally assumed In that I am currently a 
shareholder with the same exposure as the other shareholders regarding the car leases 
it seems inequitable to deposit the entire advance lease payment with Sole Source. 
Until such time that we reach an agreement regarding payment of Q-2 dividends, 
a release from the bank loan liability, full reimbursement for 94 expenses, and interest 
expense regarding my S30M CD collateral, I would extend the option for Sole Source 
to deduct my share of the lease payment from those moneys owing. Please advise 
if this is agreeable. The final submission of expenses and interest expense is forthcoming. 
Insurance: I accept the responsibility for the financial obligation regarding insurance 
coverage. However, according to Wiseman Insurance, because the car is in the name 
of the corporation, the policy must remain intact. It is perfectly legal and acceptable 
to continue to list me as the primary driver, even though I am not an active employee 
of the company. I do not have records regarding the annual premium value. Please 
let me know the amount due and how you wish to handle payment. 
2. Resolution to purchase shares. This offer is unacceptable based on the "valuation" 
of stock value. Although I am agreeable to discuss a buyout, it will first be necessary for 
aO parties to agree to a posture of being fair and equitable. This offer falls way short. 
3* Reimbursement of Expenses - According to ray records I have not submitted nor been 
nn/ni 
paid for any reimbursement of expenses incurred in 1994. If I am in error, please mail or 
fax copies of validation of payment. In feet, please confirm either way. I am working on 
the final expense documentation. I think my last check for expenses was cut in January 94, 
but for 1993 expenses. 
4* Interest Due on Loan Collateral (S30M CB) I have requested Kamdar & Co. to 
provide this billing for several months. This will reflect the difference between the interest 
I collected from the bank and the rate of interest on the note. We're not talking a lot of 
money here. I will forward upon receipt. 
5.Access to financial Information. I have not received corporate financial information 
for the Q*2 restatement or Q-3. I will need this information on a regular basis so long as I 
continue as a shareholder. Please let me know when this information will be available. 
6. Personal Guarantor - Vendor Accounts I am listed on several accounts as a personal 
guarantor. I do not have accurate records which identity these specific vendors. I think 
the list would include ZeHeibach, Lorraine, Dixon, Sun Utho, and possibly others. I 
understand you have notified vendors of my termination and that I am no longer 
authorized to purchase on behalf on Sole Source so I thought perhaps you could also 
notify the vendors that I am no longer a valid personal guarantor on the account. If you 
wish to decline to provide this notification please advise and I will proceed accordingly. 
7. Payment of Dividends- Please furnish your proposed schedule for distribution of 
dividends for the unpaid quarters. Also, please indicate the balance due my shares as of 
the period ending September 30, 1994. 
8. Valuation of Fixed Assets - As part of my separation agreement I was allowed to take 
two computers and assume ownership of the fax machine. The fax machine developed a 
malfunction with the thermal fusing bar and was taken to Lloyd's in Provo for repair. The 
estimate for repair was in excess of the value of the machine. They gave me $75 credit 
against a plain paper fax machine which I charged on a personal credit card. This was in 
June of 1994. This purchase was and will not be submitted for reimbursement. 
To prevent future conflict over division of fixed assets I suggest we establish a fair narket 
value of the equipment that I acquired from Sole Source. Additionally, how do we address 
the division of assets at the termination of the corporation, providing I am still a 
shareholder? Do we then credit the value of the computers against that asset value? 
9. Current stock value and Company worth - There are provisions in the shareholders 
agreement with respect to valuation of the company. This valuation was to take place 
annually, at the end of a fiscal year or calendar year. I do not have a current copy of die 
corporate minutes which document this activity. If we are to begin constructive 
discussion regarding a purchase of shares, it is a prerequisite to establish a value. It nay be 
best to use the year ending 1994 as a basis for valuation. We also will need to reach m 
agreement on who is to make the assessment and on what criteria. Please advise how you 
plan to proceed with this activity. 
SoleSourceMedia,3910rangaSt..SuHeB. Salt Lake City, UT 84104 (801)972-6345 / (801) 972-6269 fax 
ADDENDUM "G 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN STITT 
Dated February 27,1998 
} 
GARY L. JOHNSON [A4353] 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and BRAD STEWART, 
Defendants and Counterclaimant, 
BRAD STEWART, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM 
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
KEVIN STnT 
Civil No. 950907433 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
_ r 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF S ALT LAKE ) 
I, KEVIN STITT, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit, am over the 
age of eighteen (18) years, and am otherwise competent to testify to the facts set forth herein. 
2. From July 1, 1993 through June 30, 1996, I was an officer, director, and 
shareholder of Sole Source Media, Inc. ("Sole Source"). My office was that of secretary to the 
corporation, and in that capacity I took minutes of shareholder meetings and kept records of the 
corporation. 
3. From July 1, 1993 through 1994, Bradley K. Stewart ("Stewart") was also 
an officer, director, and shareholder of Sole Source. 
4. On October 27, 1994, a shareholders' meeting at Sole Source was held to 
consider a project from the Avery-Dennison Company ("Avery") known as "Communique." At the 
meeting, the shareholders discussed discontinuing the Communique project, and also discussed 
terminating the employment of Alane Anderson ("Anderson") and Anthony Dato ("Dato"), who 
were employees of Sole Source with specific assignments on the Communique project. 
5. During the meeting, Stewart told the shareholders that if Sole Source was not 
interested in pursuing Communique, Stewart would be interested in pursuing it on his own. 
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6. After Donald Junowich ("Junowich") left the October 27 meeting, Stewart 
told William Morris ("Morris") and me that he could not work with Junowich and suggested that 
we terminate Junowich. 
7. At sometime after the October 27 meeting, Stewart told me that he was 
planning to open a new business with Anderson in order to handle the Communique project, and said 
that I would have to choose between Junowich and Stewart. 
8. On November 4, 1994, another meeting of Sole Source shareholders was held 
at Sole Source's principal corporate office. Donald Junowich participated by telephone. Stewart, 
Morris, and I were all present. I took minutes of the meeting, and a true and correct copy of those 
minutes is attached to the accompanying Memorandum as Exhibit "4." 
9. The November 4 meeting was called to consider removing Stewart because 
he was forming a competing business. The meeting was called without prior notice. Stewart stated 
no objection to the meeting being held or to the shareholders considering any agenda items. 
10. Junowich, Morris, and I all voted to remove Stewart as a member of the Board 
of Directors, and also to remove him as an officer of Sole Source. Stewart abstained from each vote. 
11. The shareholders of Sole Source did not reaffirm the agreed value of a share 
of stock in Sole Source at the end of 1993 or 1994, as contemplated in the Shareholders Agreement. 
The shareholders also did not agree upon a new value at the end of 1993 or 1994. 
12. The certified public accountant then performing services for Sole Source 
made no adjustment in the value per share at the end of 1993 or 1994. 
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13. When Sole Source was being formed as a corporation, and the Shareholders 
Agreement was being prepared, the shareholders agreed that the value per share should be $1.00 in 
order to discourage a shareholder from leaving Sole Source and starting a competing business. 
DATED this tA day of February, 1998. 
KEVIN STITT 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
) 
: ss. 
) 
On the ^ 7 day of February, 1998, personally appeared before me, KEVIN STITT, 
whose identity has been proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, being first duly sworn, 
acknowledges that he executed the foregoing instrument, for the purposes stated therein, of his own 
voluntary act. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
187517 
sp:2/26/98 
#13314-001 
NOTARY PUBL!C 
MICHAEL C. METTERS 
734SLafc*$L 
i»»0 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ^n<4 day of-February, 1998, to the following: 
PWcW 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC. 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
a. rn,.n.„.:0 
187517 
sp:2/26/98 
#13314-001 
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ADDENDUM "H" 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM MORRIS 
Dated February 27,1998 
GARY L. JOHNSON [A4353] 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and BRAD STEWART, 
Defendants and Counterclaimant, 
BRAD STEWART, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs 
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM 
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
WILLIAM MORRIS 
Civil No. 950907433 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, WILLIAM MORRIS, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit, am over the 
age of eighteen (18) years, and am otherwise competent to testify to the facts set forth herein. 
2. From July 1, 1993 through June 30, 1996, I was an officer, director, and 
shareholder of Sole Source Media, Inc. ("Sole Source"). 
3. From July 1, 1993 through 1994, Bradley K. Stewart ("Stewart") was also 
an officer, director, and shareholder of Sole Source. 
4. In August 1994, after some negotiation and correspondence with the 
Avery-Dennison Company ("Avery"), Sole Source was notified that Avery would hire Sole Source 
to be manager for a significant project known as "Communique." 
5. However, Avery delayed commencement of the Communique project, and 
Sole Source ultimately determined it could not continue as project manager. 
6. At a meeting of Sole Source shareholders in later October 1994, the 
shareholders discussed discontinuing the Communique project. We also discussed terminating the 
employment of Alane Anderson ("Anderson") and Anthony Dato ("Dato"), who were the general 
manager and lead coordinator, respectively, of the Communique project for Sole Source. 
7. At the meeting, Stewart said that if Sole Source did not want to pursue the 
Communique project, Stewart may want to pursue it individually. 
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8. After Junowich left the meeting, Stewart told Kevin Stitt ("Stitt") and me that 
he could not work with Junowich and that we should terminate Junowich. 
9. Within a few days after the October meeting, Stewart told me that he planned 
to open a new business with Anderson to handle the Communique project, and said that I should 
take control of the company and that we would be better off without Junowich. 
10. On November 4, 1994, another shareholders' meeting was called to consider 
removing Stewart because he was forming a competing business. I voted in favor of Stewart's 
termination as a member of the Board of Directors and as an officer of Sole Source, and Donald 
Junowich ("Junowich") and Stitt also voted in favor of both proposals. Stewart abstained from each 
vote. 
11. When the Shareholders Agreement was prepared, the shareholders agreed 
upon a stock repurchase price of $1.00 per share in order to discourage a shareholder from leaving 
and starting a competing business. 
DATED this Z-n^hay of February, 1998. 
Is 
WILLIAM MORRIS 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the *ZJ day of February, 1998, personally appeared before me, WILLIAM 
MORRIS, whose identity has been proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, being first duly 
sworn, acknowledges that he executed the foregoing instrument, for the purposes stated therein, of 
his own voluntary act. 
JTARYPUBLIC ^ ^ JO : 
My Commission Expires: 
til bioeo 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^ 
MICHAEL C. METTERS 
734SUJ»a. 
^ . . a«Mi»a» .UMi 84102 
MycnmrtNiiii ru inJmy %,zm 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this^^j day of-February, 1998, to the following: 
fOcrcK 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC. 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
187516 
sp:2/27/98 
#13314-001 
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ADDENDUM "I" 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Dated December 14,1998 
GARY L. JOHNSON [A4353] 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant, 
and Third-Party Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant, and BRAD STEWART, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant, 
BRAD STEWART, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM 
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 950907433 
Judge William W. Barrett 
This matter came before the Court as previously scheduled on July 1, 1998, on 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("MPSJ"), before the Honorable William W. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 1 * 1998 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
^ ~ " Deputy 
Barrett of the Third Judicial District Court at 450 South State Street, Courtroom W35, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The Plaintiff was present through its officers William Morris and Kevin Stitt and was 
represented by its counsel Matthew C. Barneck of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson. The 
Defendant Brad Stewart was present and represented by his counsel Jeflfrey L. Silvestrini, Esq. of 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal. 
The Court issued its ruling on the Plaintiffs MPSJ on September 2, 1998 (the 
"Ruling"), and subsequently entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
consistent with its Ruling on October 13, 1998. However, because the Court signed those 
documents without reviewing the Defendant's Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated October 2, 1998, the Defendant then filed a Motion to Vacate Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment dated October 19, 1998. Accordingly, the Court 
entered an Order Vacating Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment dated 
November 9, 1998. 
The Ruling only disposed of Plaintiffs MPSJ and did not rule upon three (3) 
outstanding discovery Motions which were also briefed and argued at the same time as the Plaintiffs 
MPSJ. Those Motions include Defendant's Motion to Compel Production of Documents, Plaintiffs 
Motion for Protective Order, and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents. Because 
the parties could not agree upon a resolution of those Motions following the Court's Ruling on the 
MPSJ, Plaintiff filed a Request for Further Ruling dated October 19, 1998, seeking the Court's 
ruling on those discovery Motions. 
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Defendant then filed a Motion for New Trial/Reconsideration of Summary Judgment 
dated October 23, 1998 asking the Court to reconsider its Ruling on Plaintiffs MPSJ. That Motion 
was fully briefed with a Memorandum in Opposition from the Plaintiff and a Reply Memorandum 
from the Defendant. 
On Tuesday, November 17, 1998, the Court held a further hearing to consider 
(1) Defendant's Motion for New Trial/Reconsideration and (2) Plaintiffs Request for Further 
Ruling. The Plaintiff was again present through its officers William Morris and Kevin Stitt and was 
represented by its counsel of record Matthew C. Barneck of RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON. The Defendant Brad Stewart was represented by his counsel Jeffrey L. Silvestrini of 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL. The Court has received and reviewed the memoranda of the 
parties and heard oral argument on all pending matters, and now enters the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Sole Source Media, Inc. ("Sole Source") was a Utah corporation 
which conducted business as a graphics management company, in which Donald Junowich 
("Junowich"), William Morris ("Morris"), Kevin Stitt ("Stitt"), and Brad Stewart ("Stewart") 
were shareholders. Sole Source dissolved automatically by the terms of its articles of incorporation 
on June 30, 1996. 
2. Stewart also was an officer and director of Sole Source. 
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3. All the shareholders, including Stewart, signed a Shareholders Agreement 
dated July 1, 1993 (the "Shareholders Agreement"). Paragraph 10(a) of the Shareholders 
Agreement gave Sole Source the option to re-purchase all of Stewart's shares in the event his 
employment was terminated "for any reason other than death . . .." (Shareholders Agreement, 
110(a.) 
4. Stewart also entered an employment contract dated December 1, 1993 (the 
"Employment Contract"), which provided that "Employee shall not, during the term hereof, be 
interested directly or indirectly, in any manner, [as a] partner, officer, stockholder, advisor, 
employee or in any other capacity in any other business of the type an [sic] character of business 
engaged in by Employer, or any allied trade . . .." (Employment Contract, ^ 5.) 
5. Paragraph 9e. of the Employment Contract provides that it may be terminated 
upon the employee's breach of the agreement. Paragraph 9.d. of the Employment Contract also 
provides that it "may be terminated by Employer on thirty (30) days written notice to Employee." 
(Employment Contract, % 9.) 
6. In August 1994, Sole Source was notified by the Avery-Denison Company 
("Avery") that Avery would hire Sole Source to be manager for a significant project known as 
"Communique." At a subsequent meeting of the Sole Source shareholders on October 27, 1994, 
however, the shareholders discussed discontinuing the Communique project. "Stewart stated that 
if Sole Source did resign the Avery Project, he might be interested in pursuing it individually." 
(Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, fflf 23-25.) Stewart later informed Morris and Stitt that 
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the Avery Project was worthwhile and should be pursued by Sole Source. Stewart said that if Avery 
was unwilling to work with Junowich, a new company might be structured alongside Sole Source 
in order to facilitate the project. (Stewart Aff, fflf 21-24.) 
7. On November 4, 1994, a Sole Source shareholders meeting was held to 
consider terminating Stewart. Stewart did not object to the meeting being held. Although it is 
disputed whether Stewart abstained or voted against the proposal, it is undisputed that Junowich, 
Morris, and Stitt each voted to terminate Stewart's employment. 
8. Stewart now owns and operates Defendant Prologic, Inc., which was 
established in December 1994 as a competitor of Sole Source. 
9. On November 4, 1994, Junowich, Morris, and Stitt each signed a notice "to 
all Sole Source media employees" announcing the termination of Brad Stewart (the "Termination 
Notice"). On the same date, Morris signed a "Separation Agreement" (the "Separation 
Agreement") which recited that Stewart had been terminated as an employee of Sole Source, and 
provided certain severance benefits including one month's salary and continued use of a corporate 
automobile. Stewart acknowledges receiving the Termination Notice on or about November 4, 
1994. (Affidavit of Brad Stewart, ^ 4.) In a memorandum from Stewart to the Sole Source 
shareholders dated December 12, 1994 (the "Stewart Memorandum"), Stewart acknowledged "my 
termination from Sole Source." 
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10. On November 7, 1994, Sole Source shareholders Morris and Stitt signed an 
agreement (the "Waiver Agreement") with Stewart waiving the non-compete provision of the 
Employment Contract with respect to Avery. The stated intent of the Waiver Agreement to allow 
Stewart to pursue the Avery business without violating the Employment Contract. 
11. On December 5, 1994, Sole Source sent to Stewart by certified mail a '"Notice 
of Exercise of Option and Shareholders Action" (the "Option Notice") which notified Stewart that 
Sole Source was exercising its option to purchase Stewart's shares pursuant to the Shareholders 
Agreement. The Option Notice also tendered the purchase price of one dollar per share or a total 
of $330.00. The Option Notice instructed Stewart to deliver the shares to Sole Source duly endorsed 
no later than December 31, 1994, at which time Sole Source would tender payment in full. Stewart 
received the Option Notice and tender of purchase price but has failed and refused to surrender the 
shares. (Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, ^ 63.) By the Stewart Memorandum, Stewart 
rejected the tendered purchase price. 
12. The Shareholders Agreement states the purchase price to be paid upon 
exercise of the repurchase option. Paragraph 12(a)(ii) provides that: 
the Purchase Price shall be the "agreed value" determined in 
accordance with subsection (b) subject to adjustment by the 
independent certified public accountant then serving the Corporation 
to reflect material events and changes in circumstances occurring 
subsequent to the date on which the agreed value was last fixed. 
(Shareholders Agreement, f 12(a).) 
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13. Paragraph 12(b) provides that "the 'agreed value5 per share as of the date of 
this Agreement is one dollar ($1). This price has been agreed upon by the Corporation and the 
Shareholders as representing the fair value per Share." (Shareholders Agreement, % 12(b).) 
14. Paragraph 12(b) also provides that within sixty (60) days following the close 
of a calendar year: 
the stockholders and the Corporation shall in a writing signed by all 
of them reaffirm the agreed value or agree upon a new value. In the 
event that the stockholders and the Corporation fail either to reaffirm 
the value per Share or agree upon a new value as of the end of any 
fiscal year, the agreed value most recently fixed shall, subject to 
adjustment pursuant to subsection (a), continue in effect for all 
purposes. 
(Shareholders Agreement, ^ 12(b).) 
15. The agreed value was never adjusted by any independent certified public 
accountant serving the Corporation, and neither Stewart, Junowich, Morris, nor Stitt requested such 
an adjustment in the ordinary course of business. In the Stewart Memorandum, among other things, 
Stewart suggested that the shares of the corporation be revalued. However, the Stewart 
memorandum was sent after his termination. No revaluation of the shares was undertaken based 
upon Stewart's suggestion or for any other reason. 
16. The shareholders and Sole Source did not agree in writing or otherwise to 
reaffirm the agreed value per share or establish a new value, as provided for in paragraph 12(b) of 
the Shareholders Agreement. 
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17. The Affidavits of William Morris and Kevin Stitt submitted with Plaintiffs 
MPSJ establish that, when Sole Source was formed as a corporation, the shareholders set the agreed 
value at $1.00 per share in order to discourage a shareholder from leaving and starting a competing 
business. No other extrinsic evidence was submitted by any party bearing upon the interpretation 
of paragraph 12 of the Shareholders Agreement. 
18. At the hearing on November 17, 1998, the parties stipulated to a partial 
resolution of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents. The parties agreed that 
pursuant to Request No. 9 of Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, the parties will 
engage in a comparison of customer lists to determine if Stewart serviced any other customers 
following his termination in violation of his employment contract with Sole Source. If any such 
customers are identified, the Defendant Stewart agreed to produce documentation relating to his 
work for those customers including any financial information relating to earnings from those 
customers. All other issues in Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents were 
reserved. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the following 
Conclusions of Law. 
1. Sole Source properly terminated Stewart's employment under paragraph 9.e. 
because Stewart breached the employment contract by announcing his desire to pursue the Avery 
business. A majority of Sole Source shareholders voted at the November 4, 1994 shareholders 
meeting to terminate Stewart's employment. A unanimous decision was not required to terminate 
Stewart's employment under the Employment Contract. 
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2. Sole Source and Stewart subsequently entered the Waiver Agreement on 
November 7, 1994 allowing Stewart to pursue the Avery contract, which was based upon Stewart's 
termination three (3) days earlier. Moreover, Stewart acknowledged in the Waiver Agreement that 
he would be pursuing the Avery Business under a "new company, yet un-named." 
3. By attending and participating in the November 4, 1994 shareholders meeting, 
Stewart waived any right to object to the meeting being held. 
4. Sole Source also properly terminated Stewart's employment under paragraph 
9.d. of the Employment Contract. Sole Source gave Stewart the functional equivalent of thirty (30) 
days notice by giving him one month salary as a severance benefit and continued use of the 
corporate vehicle, as provided in the Separation Agreement. Therefore, Sole Source substantially 
complied with paragraph 9.d. of the Employment Contract. 
5. Sole Source properly exercised its repurchase option under the Shareholders 
Agreement by the Option Notice which Stewart received and to which he responded. The purchase 
price Sole Source tendered was proper under the Shareholders Agreement. The agreed value under 
the Shareholders Agreement remained at one dollar ($1.00) per share as of December 1994. 
6. Neither Sole Source nor its shareholders requested an independent certified 
public accountant to adjust the agreed value, nor were they required to do so under the Shareholders 
Agreement. The language "subject to adjustment" as contained in Paragraphs 12(a)(ii) and 12(b) 
of the Shareholders Agreement was permissive in nature and not mandatory, such that neither Sole 
Source nor its shareholders were required to engage a certified public accountant to adjust the agreed 
value per share. 
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7. Additionally, neither Sole Source nor its shareholders agreed in writing to 
reafiBrm the agreed value or establish a new value as provided for in Paragraph 12(b), and therefore 
when Sole Source exercised its repurchase option the agreed value remained at one dollar ($1.00) 
per share for all purposes. 
8. Stewart's refusal to accept the tendered purchase price and to return his shares 
were a breach of the Shareholders Agreement. The Shareholders Agreement may be specifically 
enforced by its own terms (Shareholders Agreement, <|[ 15) and under Utah law. Because the 
Shareholders Agreement contained a clear method for determining the purchase price, the parties 
intended that Sole Source's exercise of the repurchase option would terminate Stewart's status as 
a shareholder as of December 31, 1994, the date on which the Option Notice requested Stewart to 
surrender his shares and as of which the purchase price was tendered. 
9. Accordingly, Stewart's status as a shareholder was terminated as of 
December 31, 1994. Stewart has no standing to assert claims against Sole Source, Junowich, 
Morris, or Stitt for any events or actions occurring after December 31, 1994. Therefore, the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Causes of Action in Stewart's Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint 
should be dismissed as a matter of law and with prejudice, and the Sixth Cause of Action also should 
be dismissed to the extent it alleges wrongful conduct and/or seeks legal remedies based upon 
actions or events occurring after December 31, 1994. 
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10. Stewart's Second Cause of Action seeking judicial dissolution of Sole source 
because of alleged "oppression of a minority shareholder" should be dismissed as a matter of law 
and with prejudice because the claim is moot, since Sole Source dissolved on June 30, 1996 by the 
terms of its own articles of incorporation. 
11. For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to 
Compel Production of Documents because it seeks discovery relating to time periods after 
December 31, 1994, which items are not discoverable given the termination of Stewart's status as 
shareholder on that date. For the same reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order is granted. 
12. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents is granted in part 
based upon the stipulation of the parties with regard to Request No. 9. The Court reserves ruling 
on all other issues raised in the Motion. r \ 
( 4 day ofNfe^&«<l998. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
HONO 
THIRD 
/ / 
JEFFREY L. SJJLVESTRINI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ~*,01^ day of November, 1998, to the following: 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC. 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Attorneys for Defendants 
(W«rw j J^CWVHJ 
216221 
#13314-001 
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ADDENDUM "J" 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Dated December 14,1998 
GARY L. JOHNSON [A4353] 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant, 
and Third-Party Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant, and BRAD STEWART, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant, 
BRAD STEWART, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM 
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
and 
ORDER 
Civil No. 950907433 
Judge William W. Barrett 
This matter came before the Court as previously scheduled on July 1, 1998, on 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and also on Defendant's Motion to Compel 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 1 * 1998 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By 
Deputy Cleric 
Production of Documents, Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order, and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
Production of Documents, before the Honorable William W. Barrett of the Third Judicial District 
Court at 450 South State Street, Courtroom W35, Salt Lake City, Utah. The Plaintiff was present 
through its officers William Morris and Kevin Stitt and was represented by its counsel Matthew C. 
Barneck of RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON. The Defendant Brad Stewart was 
present and represented by his counsel Jeffrey L. Silvestrini of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL. 
For reasons detailed in the accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
the Court held a further hearing in this matter on Tuesday, November 17, 1998 to consider 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial/Reconsideration of Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Request 
for Further Ruling. The Court received and reviewed the memoranda of the parties, heard oral 
argument on all pending matters, and has entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of this 
same date. Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as 
follows: 
1. Defendant Brad Stewart's status as a shareholder of Sole Source Media, Inc. 
was terminated on December 31, 1994 by Sole Source's proper exercise of its stock repurchase 
option, as detailed in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
2. The First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Causes of Action of Brad Stewart's 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint shall be and are hereby dismissed as a matter of law and 
with prejudice, and the Sixth Cause of Action also is dismissed to the extent it alleges wrongful 
conduct and/or seeks legal remedies based upon actions or events occurring after December 31, 
1994. 
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3. The Second Cause of Action of Stewart's Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint is also dismissed as a matter of law and with prejudice because it is moot, based upon 
Sole Source's earlier dissolution under the terms of its articles of incorporation. 
4. Defendant's Motion to Compel Production of Documents is denied. 
5. PlaintifFs Motion for Protective Order is granted, and Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel Production of Documents is granted in part based upon a stipulation of the parties. The 
Court reserves ruling on all other issues raised in Plaintiffs Motion to compel Production of 
Documents. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 30t!Lday of November, 1998, to the following: 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC. 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Attorneys for Defendants 
P^x,-^ / ivu i\-.: 0 
216255 
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ADDENDUM "K" 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
Dated April 26,1999 
APR 2 a r -n 
By 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant, 
and Third-Party Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and BRAD STEWART, 
Defendants and Counterclaimant, 
BRAD STEWART, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM 
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
Civil No. 950907433 
Judge William W. Barrett 
* " w e COUNT 
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This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel dated 
March 19, 1998. The Motion was fully briefed and first argued before the Court on July 1, 1998, 
along with two (2) other discovery Motions and a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The 
Court's ruling issued September 2, 1998 addressed only the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
A subsequent hearing was held on November 17, 1998, and following that the Court 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and Order each dated 
December 14, 1998. Those Orders addressed the other discovery Motions but reserved ruling on 
the Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, except with regard to Request No. 9 as to which the parties 
reached a stipulation. 
Plaintiff then filed a subsequent Request for Further Ruling dated March 17, 1999 
with regard to Request Nos. 4 through 8 of the Plaintiff's First Request for Production of 
Documents, as addressed in the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. This Court issued its Ruling on 
April 12, 1999 granting the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel with respect to Request Nos. 4 through 8. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is granted with respect to Request Nos. 4 
through 8 of Plaintiff's First Request for Production of Documents. 
2. The documents requested shall be produced within tldrty (30) days of this 
Order. 
DATED this <^£?day of April, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC. 
L. SILVESTRINI 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed, 
first-class, postage prepaid, on this 3.3 nA day of April, 1999, to the following: 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC. 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
I^OAJT^^. U. fYj,,h*M*\ V 
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bjm:4/15/99 
#13314-001 
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ADDENDUM "L" 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Dated July 13,1999 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant, 
and Third-Party Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and BRAD STEWART, 
Defendants and Counterclaimant, 
BRAD STEWART, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM 
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 950907433 
Judge William W. Barrett 
fcsasasr 
"Strict 
JUL 1 3
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This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorney 
Fees. The Court has received and reviewed that Motion along with the accompanying Memorandum 
in Support and the Affidavit of Matthew C. Barneck, each of which were dated April 23, 1999. The 
Court also received and reviewed Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Award of Attorney fees dated May 10, 1999, and Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Award of Attorney Fees dated May 18, 1999. The Court then issued its ruling by 
disposition summary dated June 7, 1999. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds the following facts in relation to the Plaintiffs Motion for Award 
of Attorney Fees: 
1. Defendants' Counterclaim alleged certain causes of action based upon an 
Employment Contract dated December 1, 1993 between Defendant Brad K. Stewart ("Stewart") and 
Plaintiff Sole Source Media, Inc. ("Sole Source"), including claims for declaratory judgment, breach 
of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
2. By a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated March 3, 1998 (the 
"MPSJ"), Sole Source sought the dismissal of those and other causes of action in the Counterclaim. 
3. Through a series of rulings detailed in Plaintiffs Memorandum, the Court 
granted the MPS J and ultimately entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment 
and Order dated December 14, 1998. 
2
 00712 
4. The Employment Contract contains the following provision regarding the 
recovery of attorney fees: 
In the event that any action is filed in relation to this Contract, 
the unsuccessful party in the action shall pay to the successful party, 
in addition to all the sums that either party may be called upon to pay, 
a reasonable sum for the successful party's attorneys' fees. 
(Employment Contract, 1f 16.) 
5. The parties also filed a series of discovery Motions including the following: 
a. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel dated March 19, 1998. 
b. Defendants' Motion to Compel Production of 
Documents dated February 3, 1998. 
c. Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order dated 
February 13, 1998. 
Those Motions were briefed and heard by the Court as detailed in the Plaintiffs Memorandum. 
6. The Court ruled in favor of Sole Source and the Third-Party Defendants on 
all of those Motions. 
7. In pursuing the MPSJ and in pursuing and defending the discovery Motions, 
Sole Source and the Third-Party Defendants incurred attorney fees of $8,394.85 and costs of 
$367.82, for a total of $8,762.67. The attorney fees are based upon the number of hours worked and 
the rates charged as identified in the AflSdavit of Matthew C. Barneck, ffij 4-8. The costs incurred 
are itemized in ^  9 of the AflSdavit. 
8. The Affidavit of Matthew C. Barneck adequately and properly identifies the 
specific work performed in relation to the MPSJ and the discovery Motions, as shown in fflf 4-6 of 
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the Affidavit. The Affidavit also fairly allocates and categorizes the proportion of fees relating to 
the MPS J that were incurred to obtain a dismissal of claims "in relation to" the Employment 
Contract. 
) A Nsf* ^' DefendantS^pcgsented no opposing evidence re gnrriinp; the nth M IH y l< J , ,iinl ' 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court now makes the following Conclusions of Law with regard to the Plaintiffs 
Motion for Award of Attorney Fees. 
1. The portions of the Counterclaim identified in the Findings No. 1 above 
constitute an action in relation to the Employment Contract. Sole Source was the successfiil party 
and Stewart was the unsuccessful party in that action, as contemplated in TJ16 of the Employment 
Contract. Accordingly, the Court concludes that an award of fees and costs to Sole Source is 
appropriate. 
2. With respect to each of the discovery Motions identified in the Findings of 
Fact above, Sole Source was the prevailing party and Stewart was the losing party as contemplated 
by Rule 37(aX4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court concludes that Stewart's pursuit 
and defense of those Motions was not substantially justified and that no other circumstances make 
an award of expenses unjust. Accordingly, the Court concludes that an award of fees and expenses 
to Sole Source and Third-Party Defendants is appropriate. 
3. Considering the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in 
presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, fees customarily 
4
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charged in the Salt Lake City area for similar services, the amount involved in the case and the 
results attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved, the Court concludes that 
the amount of attorney fees and costs Plaintiff seeks is reasonable. Specifically, the Court concludes 
that the amount and type of work performed was reasonable given the nature of the case, and that 
the rates charged by the Plaintiff's counsel were reasonable. 
4. The Court concludes that Defendant Stewart should pay to Sole Source and 
Third-Party Defendants $8,394.85 in attorney fees and $367.82 in costs, for a total of $8,762.67. 
DATED this f O day tfj&ASq&W. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC. 
JEFFREY L. SHVESTRINI 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this J / jj-day of June, 1999, to the following: 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT& SEGAL, PC. 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
ft^Jr^ f m^^J) 
257211 
bjm:6/21/99 
#13314-001 
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ADDENDUM "M" 
ORDER AWARDING 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Dated July 13,1999 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant, 
and Third-Party Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and BRAD STEWART, 
Defendants and Counterclaimant, 
BRAD STEWART, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM 
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES 
Civil No. 950907433 
Judge William W. Barrett 
a
'
ci<Uo,CoO», 
nn-71 n 
This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorney 
Fees dated April 23, 1999. The Court considered the Plaintiffs Motion, its supporting 
Memorandum, and the Affidavit of Matthew C. Barneck, as well as the Defendants' Memorandum 
in Opposition and the Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum. The Court issued its ruling without a hearing 
by a Disposition Summary dated June 7, 1999, and granted the Plaintiffs Motion for Award of 
Attorney Fees. The Court further has entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of this same 
date. 
Based up the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS that Defendant Brad K. Stewart 
shall pay to the Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants $8,394.85 in attorney fees and $367.82 in costs, 
for a sum total of $8,762.67. That amount shall be paid within thirty (30) days after entry of this 
Order. 
DATED this I *+* day < 
BY THE COURTS 
t 
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC. 
JEFFREY L. SELVESTRINI 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
00718 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ^ / ^ d a y of June, 1999, to the following: 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC. 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
fSo^In^ y. yvuLw^Ly 
257242 
bjm:6/21/99 
#13314-001 
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ADDENDUM "N" 
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW C. BARNECK 
Dated April 23,1999 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant, 
and Third-Party Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and BRAD STEWART, 
Defendants and Counterclaimant, 
BRAD STEWART, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM 
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK 
Civil No. 950907433 
Judge William W. Barrett 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, MATTHEW C. BARNECK, being first duly sworn depose and state as follows: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and otherwise competent to testify 
to the facts set forth in this Affidavit. 
2. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar Association and have 
been since 1988, and have been continuously engaged in the practice of law in the State of Utah 
since 1988. I am also a member in good standing of the Colorado State Bar Association since 1996. 
3. I have been the principal attorney representing Plaintiff Sole Source Media, 
Inc. ("Sole Source") and Third-Party Defendants William Morris ("Morris"), Kevin Stitt ("Stitt"), 
and Donald Junowich ("Junowich") in this matter. 
4. In pursuing Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and defending against Stewart's 
Motion to Compel including the accompanying Motion for Protective Order, Plaintiff and 
Third-Party Defendants have incurred the following fees and costs: 
Description of Work 
Legal research to prepare Motion for 
Protective Order, Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion to Compel, and 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel; draft each of 
those Motions and Memoranda; evaluate 
Defendant's responses to each; legal research 
for and drafting of Reply Memoranda in 
Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Protective 
Order and Motion to Compel; draft Request 
for Further Ruling on Discovery Motions. 
Attorney 
Matthew C. Barneck 
Brett L. Tolman 
(law clerk) 
Cheri K. Gochberg 
(law clerk) 
Total 
No. of 
Hours 
28.0 
4.8 
4.5 
37,3 
Amount of 
Fees/Costs 
$2,304.10 
264.00 
247.50 
$2,815.60 1 
2 
r\r\c~ n 
5. In pursuing the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on behalf of Sole 
Source, Morris, Stitt, and Junowich, the following work was done and attorney fees incurred: 
Description of Work 
Legal research to prepare Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment; draft Motion, 
Memorandum, and supporting Affidavits; 
evaluate Defendant's Memorandum in 
Opposition; legal research for and drafting of 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment; prepare Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
and Order, to implement Court's September 2, 
1998 ruling; legal research for and drafting of 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
1 Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial. 
Attorney 
Matthew C. Barneck 
No. of 
Hours 
36.3 
Amount of 
Fees/Costs 
$4,489.50 
For reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, Sole Source seeks an award 
of at least fifty percent (50%) of these fees related to its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in 
a precise amount to be determined by the Court. Fifty percent (50%) of that amount equals 
$2,244.75. 
6. Much of the work on behalf of Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants was done 
to pursue or defend all of the four (4) motions described above and cannot be segregated feasibly. 
In that regard, the following work was done and the following fees incurred: 
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Description of Work 
Prepare for July 1, 1998 hearing on all motions 
including preparation of exhibits, hearing 
binders, and outline for oral argument; attend 
hearing and argue all four (4) Motions; 
prepare for and attend November 17, 1998 
hearing on Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration/New Trial and Objections to 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
on Plaintiffs Request for Further Ruling re 
discovery motions; further preparation of final 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment and Order; prepare Motion for 
1 Attorney Fees. 
Attorney 
Matthew C. Barneck 
No. of 
Hours 
24.7 
Amount of 
Fees/Costs 
$3,334.50 
7. Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants have also incurred the following costs 
in connection with the work described above: 
Type of Cost 
Photocopies 
Electronic legal research 
Hearing exhibits and hearing binders 
[ Total 
Amount 
$102.70 1 
155.43 1 
109.69 
$367.82 
8. The total amount of fees and costs incurred in connection with these Motions, 
for which an award is sought, is at least the following: 
Total fees: 
Total costs: 
GRAND TOTAL 
$ 8,394.85 
367.82 
$ 8.762.67 
9. The work described above and the amount of hours spent performing that 
work were reasonable and necessary given the nature of the case, the claims alleged by Defendant 
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and Third-Party Plaintiff, and the complexity of the facts and legal issues involved. The rates 
charged for Matthew C. Barneck range from $110.00 to $135.00 per hour over the span of the nearly 
two (2) years time during which the work was performed. The rate for law clerks Brett L. Tolman 
and Cheri K. Gochberg was $55.00. Those rates are reasonable and comparable to the rates of other 
attorneys and law clerks in the Salt Lake County, Utah, area with similar experience in similar cases. 
10. The description above of work performed, including the number of hours and 
the amount of fees and costs incurred, is the result of a careful review of billings over the past two 
(2) years. The majority of the total fees and costs actually incurred by Plaintiff and Third-Party 
Defendants in this action have not been included in this Affidavit, but only those which directly 
relate to the motions identified above on which Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants have been the 
prevailing parties. With regard to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Sole Source only 
seeks fees for the approximate portion of that work which related to the Employment Contract. 
DATED this ^ 3 day of April, 1999. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 2 3 day of April, 1999, personally appeared before me, MATTHEW C. 
BARNECK, whose identity has been proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, being first duly 
5 00653 
sworn, acknowledges that he executed the foregoing instrument, for the purposes stated therein, of 
his own voluntary act. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
SANDRA PRIONS 
1697 North 120OMM 
CftmUWlMOIS 
MyG3mmalonE>0NiMKl>aoa4 
stmofUM 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
r/w./ *. zoo? 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 2 3 ^ day of April, 1999, to the following: 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC. 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff 
249103 
bjm:4/23/99 
#13314-001 
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